









Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Liu, M. (2021). Interdependent individuals: How aggregation, observation, and persuasion affect economic
behavior and judgment. CentER, Center for Economic Research.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.






















































How aggregation, observation, and persuasion 
affect economic behavior and judgment









Interdependent individuals: How aggregation, observation, 

















Proefschrift ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan Tilburg University 
op gezag van de rector magnificus, prof. dr. W.B.H.J. van de Donk, in het 
openbaarte verdedigen ten overstaan van een door het college voor 
promoties aangewezen commissie in de Aula van de Universiteit 




geboren te Hubei, China 
	
	
Promotores: prof. dr. E.C.M. van der Heijden (Tilburg University) 




leden promotiecommissie: prof. dr. S. Gächter (University of Nottingham) 
prof. dr. R. Weber (University of Zurich) 
prof. dr. S. Suetens (Tilburg University) 


































©2021 Manwei Liu, The Netherlands.  All rights reserved. No parts of this thesis may be reproduced, 
stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission of the author. 
Alle rechten voorbehouden. Niets uit deze uitgave mag worden vermenigvuldigd, in enige vorm of op 
enige wijze, zonder voorafgaande schriftelijke toestemming van de auteur.  
 
Interdependent individuals: How aggregation,






This dissertation has witnessed some of the most enjoyable and challenging
years of my life. It would have missed the enjoyable part had I not been blessed
with the love and support of many people.
First and foremost, I wish to thank my supervisors, Eline van der Heijden
and Jan Potters, for their incredible guidance and unconditional support both
academically and emotionally throughout these years. What they led me to see
has fundamentally shaped how I view research and life. Special thanks to Eline,
who is the co-author of chapter 2, for her sharp eyes have saved me from making
vital or embarrassing mistakes three (maybe more) times. What is more impor-
tant, Eline has always been a caring, helpful, and trusting person with great
energy ever since our first conversation. Jan sets a good example as a passionate
researcher and lecturer. His ability of switching between the serious mode and
the witty mode so smoothly keeps every meeting alive.
I would also like to express my sincere gratitude to the committee mem-
bers, Boris van Leeuwen, Sigrid Suetens, and Roberto Weber, for they kindly
responded to my needs and shared their insights and expertise in the develop-
ment of this dissertation whenever I asked for. A big thank you to Simon Gächter
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The topic of this dissertation is the interdependence of individuals, specifically,
how individuals are influenced by the social environment and social interactions
they engage in. In the three chapters of this dissertation, I explore how observa-
tion, aggregation, and persuasion affect judgment and economic decision making.
All of the three chapters combine behavioral insights with experimental meth-
ods.
Through a collective-choice rule, groups can aggregate individual preferences
into a collective decision. Chapter 2 explores the role of collective-choice rules
in self-governance in a public goods game, and shows that collective-choice rules
affect cooperation directly and indirectly. By observing what others do, people
extract information from the environment. In chapter 3, I demonstrate that ob-
serving a reference action suffices to affect moral judgments. Chapter 4 studies
how people deal with information slant and studies the persistent effect of per-
suasion on judgments and decisions.
Chapter 2 focuses on collective-choice rules used to aggregate individual choices
into a group choice. The context of this study is self-governance via institutional
design in social dilemmas. In a social dilemma situation, people often appeal to
institutions, for example, sanction systems, to sustain cooperation and achieve
self-governance. Individual preferences over institutions are aggregated via a
certain collective-choice rule into a collective institutional choice. For instance, a
referendum is held to decide whether a society adopts a new policy. This study
uses an experiment to explore the direct and indirect effects of three different
collective-choice rules (majority voting, dictatorship, and rotating dictatorship)
on cooperation in a public goods game. Do people behave more pro-socially if in-
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stitutions are chosen through a democratic rule than if identical institutions are
generated by a non-democratic rule? Do collective-choice rules affect the stability
of institutions and in turn affect cooperation?
The results show that cooperation levels are higher with the institutions cho-
sen by a dictator than with the same institutions chosen by rotating dictators.
Rotating dictatorship tends to produce less stable institutions than majority vot-
ing or fixed dictatorship. And the instability of institutions is associated with
lower cooperation levels. This study contributes to the strand of literature that
examines the significance of collective-choice rules. Apart from adding new ev-
idence to the direct effect of collective-choice rules, we demonstrate that stabil-
ity matters for the effectiveness of collective decisions. Chapter 3 also extends
the vast literature on the endogenous emergence of institutions by allowing for
greater freedom in self-governance via institutional design.
Economic literature often sees moral judgments as static and internal: people
evaluate an action or a person who chooses that action solely based on how they
perceive the nature of the action (for instance, see Abeler et al.,2019; Gneezy
et al,2018). Chapter 3 examines whether moral judgments are relative, that is,
whether moral judgments about a decision maker depend on a reference action.
Such dependence may result from a contrast effect and/or from changes of per-
ceived social norms, which is referred to as a norm-shifting effect. Intuitively,
the contrast effect makes a good action look better, while the norm-shifting effect
makes a common action look better. The two effects do not always work in the
same direction, and thus the reference action may have an asymmetric effect on
judgments about moral decision makers and immoral decision makers. I use an
experiment to test the predictions.
The results show that people’s moral judgments toward a decision maker de-
pend on the reference decision maker’s action. Such dependence is indeed asym-
metric for judgments about moral and immoral decision makers. In particular,
people punish an immoral decision maker more harshly if the reference choice
is moral than if it is immoral. A contrast effect, rather than a shift in perceived
social norms, accounts for this finding. The punishment moral decision makers
inflicted does not vary with the reference choice. Moral judgments do not depend
on the perceived descriptive norm. This paper adds to the literature on how
previous experience shapes preferences and values and speaks to the growing
literature on the determinants of moral decisions.
Chapter 4 studies the persistent effect of information slant. Information slant
conveys a particular viewpoint or inclination by choice of words, tone, and fram-
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ing without necessarily misrepresenting the underlying facts. Sometimes people
are still persuaded by information slant despite being aware that it is partial.
It is not clear whether and how people can counteract its impact. This chapter
examines whether and to what extent we can mitigate the impact of informa-
tion slant by providing people with an opportunity to acquire more information
from both sides of the issue. In a controlled experiment, we choose a concrete
issue, the use of GMO mosquitoes in disease control, and construct two versions
of slanted articles. The slanted articles are based on the same set of underlying
facts but slanted toward either the pro-GMO side or anti-GMO side. Subjects are
well informed that the article they receive is slanted toward one side of the issue
and toward which side exactly. We elicit subjects’ attitudes toward the use of
GMO mosquitoes after their exposure to the slanted article. Next, we offer sub-
jects an opportunity to acquire more information from both sides and elicit their
attitudes for a second time to see whether and in what direction their attitudes
change.
The results show that information slant indeed shifts subjects’ attitudes in
the direction aligned with the initial article compared to the attitudes of those
who have seen both sides. The opportunity to acquire information from both
sides only slightly mitigates the impact of information slant, as there is mild ev-
idence that attitudes move closer after information acquisition, whereas exoge-
nously imposed information does not narrow the gap between subjects exposed
to different sides. We find that the impact of initial information slant may be
persistent: it shifts subjects’ attitudes, and the shift in attitudes in turn induces
confirmation bias which distorts the way people process subsequent information.
This study contributes to the understanding of how people deal with information
slant embedded in natural language. It also highlights the role that media bias
plays in shaping opinions and preferences.

Chapter 2
The role of collective-choice
rules in self-governance via
institutional design
2.1 Introduction
Social dilemmas are situations characterized by a conflict between individual in-
terests and collective interests. In such situations, an individual is better off if
she/he defects instead of cooperates, but the group is better off if all cooperate
than if all defect. In order to sustain cooperation and to achieve self-governance
in such social dilemma situations, groups often appeal to institutions. The op-
timal institutional design, however, is usually not obvious, because it depends
on the incentives institutions provide, the group members’ characteristics, and
the group dynamics. We therefore consider groups’ self-governance through in-
stitutional design as a problem-solving process. In this process, a group needs
a collective-choice rule to aggregate its members’ preferences over institutions
into a collective decision. In this study, we focus on the instrumental values of
collective-choice rules in the problem-solving process. Specifically, we explore
whether, and if so how, collective-choice rules affect groups’ cooperation and per-
formance in a social dilemma situation.
We use an experiment to simulate a social dilemma situation where groups
can choose from a variety of institutions to achieve self-governance. The ba-
This chapter is based on the joint work with Eline van der Heijden.
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sic game is a repeated standard public goods game. Every three rounds, group
members select institutions as additional rules on top of the basic game. Indi-
vidual institutional choices are aggregated via a given collective-choice rule into
a group institutional choice. Groups then play the public goods game with the
chosen institutions for three rounds. We employ a between-subjects design: ev-
ery group uses only one collective-choice rule throughout the game. Specifically,
we implement three collective-choice rules: majority voting, dictatorship (i.e. a
single decision maker) and rotating dictatorship (i.e. single decision makers on
a rotating basis). Examples of rotating dictatorship are the presidency rotation
of the EU council, the presidency rotation of the UN Security Council, etc. These
rules are natural candidates to start with because they are simple, representa-
tive, and they constitute the basis for more complicated collective-choice rules.
In our social dilemma context, collective-choice rules may have a direct or
an indirect effect on cooperation. The direct effect refers to the influence of
collective-choice rules on cooperation, conditional on institutions. The indirect
effect describes the influence of collective-choice rules on cooperation through
the choice of institutions.
Collective-choice rules may directly influence cooperation because people have
a preference for democratic participation right and value decision right (Bartling
et al., 2014; Fehr et al., 2013). Their preference for participation right might
be translated into support for the resulting decision (Castore and Murnighan,
1978). For instance, some studies on endogenous institutions find an “endogene-
ity premium” in the sense that policies chosen by the subjects are more effec-
tive than identical policies selected randomly by the computer or imposed exoge-
nously by the experimenter (Arbak and Villeval, 2011; Dal Bó et al., 2010; Casari
and Luini, 2009; Kamei, 2016; Markussen et al., 2013; Rivas and Sutter, 2011;
Tyran and Feld, 2006). In a similar vein, we explore in this study whether there
exists a “democracy premium”. That is, given that the institutions are chosen en-
dogenously, do people behave more pro-socially if these institutions are produced
by a democratic rule compared to a situation in which the same institutions are
generated by a non-democratic rule?
Collective-choice rules may also indirectly affect cooperation through their in-
fluence on institutions. The indirect effect may come from at least two sources,
namely through the types of the institutions chosen and through the stability
of the institutional outcomes. As to the types of institutions, we see institu-
tional design as a solution to social dilemma specific to groups. The solution is
not necessarily unique and is at each group’s discretion. We do not have any
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supporting theories or evidences to predict the best fitting institutions given a
certain collective-choice rule. Nor do we intend to identify the good types of in-
stitutions from the bad types. Therefore, we do not form any ex ante hypothesis
regard this source in this paper.1 The second source concerns the stability of
the institutions. Different collective-choice rules may produce more stable or
more unstable institutions over time, and this may affect cooperation. The in-
stability of collective choices, in particular of majority rule outcomes, has been
of concern to political scientists and some economists (Haney et al., 1992; Hoff-
man and Plott, 1983; McKelvey and Ordeshook, 1984; Plott and Levine, 1978;
Riker, 1980; Wilson, 1986). And research has shown that political instability can
be detrimental to economic performance (Aisen and Veiga, 2013; Alesina et al.,
1996; Barro, 1991; Dixit, 2009; Feng, 1997). In our paper, we focus on the indirect
effect of collective-choice rules via the (in)stability of institutions rather than via
the types of institutions.
A distinct feature of our experiment is that we allow for a rather broad range
of institutional design. Existing experimental research on endogenous institu-
tions focuses largely on the emergence of a certain type of institution, for in-
stance, a sanction system. Groups are typically offered a take-it-or-leave-it op-
tion: either they implement a particular institution or not implement it (Bischoff,
2007; Ertan et al., 2009; Fehr and Williams, 2013; Guillen et al., 2007; Gürerk
et al., 2009; Potters et al., 2005; Sutter et al., 2010). We provide participants with
a “menu” of institutions with three items on it: communication, punishment, and
reputation. For each item, groups choose whether to implement it or not. This
gives them in total eight different combinations of institutions for institutional
design. For example, a group can choose communication and punishment, or all
of the three institutions. We believe that our menu includes common and crucial
institutional features. Communication, punishment, and reputation are among
the most intensively studied institutions in economic experiments. Perhaps even
more importantly, Rockenbach and Wolff (2016) show that when people can cre-
ate any institution they prefer, their creations are often limited to a handful of
institutions, including communication, punishment, and information feedback.
Another novel characteristic of our design is that we explicitly incorporate in-
stitutional costs. Running and maintaining an institution typically entails costs.
1One may argue that, since dictators do not need to coordinate with anyone on the institutional
choice, they can choose a (pro-social) institution more easily than groups with majority rule. However,
there is no guarantee that “good” institutions will be chosen with a better chance. Dictators can make
wrong institutional choices as easily as they make right ones. Beside, the dictators are not necessarily
pro-social. They can choose punishment to hinder free-riding, or they can make sure free-riding is
not punished.
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Some institutions have the property of being a public good. Once they are estab-
lished and made to work, each group member can benefit from increased cooper-
ation regardless of whether she pays for it or not. A second-order social dilemma
is thus formed. For example, punishing someone else typically entails costs for
the punisher, while other group members can benefit from enforced cooperation
without paying any additional cost.2 Therefore, the successful establishment and
use of an effective institution also calls for agreement on who pays for the insti-
tutional costs. In our experiment, subjects need to decide collectively on how to
divide the costs for each institution (through the given collective-choice rule).
Our main findings are as follows. First, we do not find evidence of a “democ-
racy premium”. On the contrary, fixed dictatorship has a positive direct effect
on contribution behavior and earnings compared with rotating dictatorship. Sec-
ond, institutional choices generated by rotating dictators are significantly more
unstable than those generated via majority voting or fixed dictatorship. Third,
the instability of institutional choices is associated with lower cooperation lev-
els. Finally, overall, groups in the fixed dictatorship treatment achieve higher
cooperation levels, spend less on institutions, and hence earn more than those in
rotating dictatorship.
To our knowledge, this paper is the first to investigate both the direct and in-
direct effects of collective-choice rules on cooperation in a social dilemma environ-
ment. We contribute to the discussion over the instrumental value of collective-
choice rules. We provide two perspectives: participation right and stability. Peo-
ple might value the participation right ensured by democratic collective-choice
rules, but our findings suggest that such rules do not necessarily bring better
performance nor lead to a more cooperative community. Our results also imply
that the stability of collective decisions may be important and therefore deserves
to be included when discussing the impact of collective-choice rules on group
decision-making. These findings have implications for the organization of small-
scale group decision-making.
2.2 Related literature
Our paper is related to two strands of literature. The first strand of literature ex-
amines the endogenous emergence of a certain type of institution. In most exper-
2Related literature finds that people suffer as much from higher order social dilemmas as from
first-order social dilemma (Sigmund et al., 2010; Zhang et al., 2014). Fehr and Gächter (2002) claim
that free riding can only be solved if sufficient agents are willing to “altruistically” provide the second-
order public good.
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imental studies, subjects are offered an exogenously given institution, and they
can choose to implement this institution or not (Bischoff, 2007; Ertan et al., 2009;
Fehr and Williams, 2013; Guillen et al., 2007; Gürerk et al., 2009; Markussen
et al., 2013; Potters et al., 2005; Sutter et al., 2010). For example, in Guillen
et al. (2007), after having experienced a central sanction mechanism for sev-
eral rounds, groups can choose whether to keep it; they all choose to remove
the sanction system. Potters et al. (2005) let two players decide unanimously
whether to apply a sequential structure in a voluntary contribution mechanism.
Groups predominantly choose to move sequentially. Some studies have expanded
the institution set to examine variations of a certain type of institution. For in-
stance, Sutter et al. (2010) provide subjects with three institutions to choose
from: standard voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM), VCM with punish-
ment, and VCM with reward. They find that groups prefer the reward option,
although punishment turns out to be more effective in sustaining cooperation.
Fehr and Williams (2013) offer four communities different forms of a punish-
ment system to choose from, including one without punishment. They find that
a centralized punishment system dominates and almost eliminated free-riding.
An expansion of this strand of the research compares the effectiveness of en-
dogenous institutions with the same institutions exogenously imposed by the
experimenters (Arbak and Villeval, 2011; Dal Bó et al., 2010; Casari and Luini,
2009; Kamei, 2016; Markussen et al., 2013; Rivas and Sutter, 2011; Tyran and
Feld, 2006). Findings from these studies provide the basis for our conjecture
about the direct effect of collective-choice rules.
We contribute to this strand of literature by pushing endogenous institutions
to the direction of institutional design. Compared with existing literature, we
give subjects more freedom in choosing and designing institutions and allow
subjects to repeatedly change their institutional choices. We choose this design
not only because institutional design and its evolution are interesting in them-
selves, but also because the collective decision to be made–choosing the right set
of institutions–varies with timing and the group composition and thus it is diffi-
cult and conflict-invoking. Collective-choice rules likely play a bigger role when
there are disagreements. It is for a similar reason that the institutions in our de-
sign are costly. The study of Rockenbach and Wolff (2016) mostly resembles such
an idea of institutional design. In their study, subjects can create any rules for
a public good game , and they can repeatedly improve their design. The authors
then decompose the subjects’ rule sets into rule components and classify these
components along different categories. They find that subjects usually combine
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two or more rule components, rather than use exclusively a single category of in-
stitution. In particular, designers often implement vertical communication and
punishment and abstain from giving feedback on contributions. A critical differ-
ence between our setting and theirs is that we have more control on the collective
decisions process by providing a preset menu of institutions. The institutions we
offer are the ones that were chosen most frequently by subjects in the paper by
Rockenbach and Wolff (2016), communication, punishment and information.
The second strand of literature investigates the difference between collective-
choice rules from various perspectives. Some papers view collective-choice rules
as information aggregation devices and look at how these rules influence the
accuracy of group decisions (Nitzan and Paroush, 1982; Shapley and Grofman,
1984; Sorkin et al., 2001). For instance, Shapley and Grofman (1984) shows the-
oretically that collective-choice rules affect the likelihood of a correct choice and
suggests that simple majority rule may be near optimal for large groups. Sorkin
et al. (2001) compares super majority, simple majority, and unanimity from a
signal detection theory perspective. They find that simple majority performs the
best and unanimity is the worst. Other studies use collective-choice rules as de-
vices to resolve conflicts of individual distributional preferences (Buchanan and
Tullock, 1962; Dougherty et al., 2014; Walker et al., 2000). For example, Walker
et al. (2000) studies how majority voting and unanimity affect the allocation pro-
posals and efficiency gains in a common pool resources game. Their results sug-
gest that unanimity rules lead to higher efficiency in symmetric groups with
complete information.
We contribute to the research on collective-choice rules by adding another
perspectives. We see collective-choice rules as problem-solving devices that in-
volve more than information and preference aggregation. In our study, subjects
are placed in a relatively rich decision environment, in which they interact with
each other under strategic uncertainty. The complex but arguably more realistic
setting enables us to see how collective-choice rules affect behavior and perfor-
mance from new angles.
2.3 Experimental design and procedure
2.3.1 The Institutional Design Game
We use what we call an “Institutional Design Game” (IDG) to simulate a social
dilemma environment where groups can design their own institutions. The main
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body of the IDG is a standard public goods game. The standard game can be
modified by using institutions which affect the rules of the game. Groups choose
institutions via a collective-choice rule. Therefore, a group’s choices of institu-
tions pin down a personalized version of a modified public goods game for the
group.
Many things can be varied in the IDG, depending on the research interest.
Since our main aim is to examine whether, and to what extent, collective-choice
rules affect cooperation behavior in such a social dilemma situation, we fix the
collective-choice rule for each group. The details on the basic game, the avail-
able institutions, and how the collective-choice rules work are provided in the
following subsections. In the last subsection we formulate the hypotheses.
Standard public goods game
The main body of the IDG is a standard three person public goods game widely
used in studies into social dilemmas (Ledyard, 1994). The public goods game is
repeated for 18 rounds, which are divided into six terms of three rounds. In every
round, group members are assigned ID numbers as their temporary identity; ID
numbers change every round. The three participants form a fixed group (partner
matching). We use subscript i œ 1, 2, 3 to denote individual level decisions and
subscript j to denote group level decisions or outcomes. In every round, all group
members receive an endowment e = 20 points, and they decide simultaneously
how much to invest in a public project. Every point invested into the project
yields a return – = 0.5 to each group member. Points that are kept in private
remain unchanged. The payoff function of player i in round t if he chooses to
invest xit into the public project is then:




The marginal per capita return – = 0.5 ensures that there is a conflict be-
tween group interest and individual interest since 0.5 < 1 while 3 ú 0.5 > 1. That
is, there are incentives to achieve a higher contribution level; full cooperation
gives every group member 30 while fully selfish group members earn 20. Af-
ter contributions have been made, group members receive information on every
group member’s contribution and payoff in the current round. However, with-
out reputation, the contribution and payoff information is shown in match with
the temporary IDs in the current round. With reputation, the contribution and
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payoff information is shown together with IDs fixed for the current term (see the
next section for more details).
Institutions
In the experiment, several institutions can be established to extend the rules of
the basic game. At the beginning of each term, groups can choose the institu-
tion(s) to be implemented in that term. We provide a menu with three available
institutions: communication, reputation, and punishment. For each institution,
groups choose whether to implement it or not. This gives subjects the freedom
to combine two or more institutions. For instance, a group can choose communi-
cation and reputation, or communication and punishment. It is also possible to
implement none of the institutions. Hence, there are in total eight possible insti-
tutional choices. To avoid connotation, in the experiment, these institutions are
referred to as mechanism A, B and C, respectively. For each group, the individ-
ual choices are aggregated to determine if an institution will be implemented in
a term. How individual choices are aggregated depends on the collective choice
rule, i.e. on the treatment.
One property of institutions is that they are typically costly to establish and/or
to maintain. To capture this characteristic in the experiment, the establishment
of an institution in a group costs 3 points per round, and these costs will be
shared equally among group members in each of the three rounds of the term.
On top of that, every time the function of communication/punishment is exe-
cuted, a variable cost arises, as will be described in more detail below. Variable
costs can be shared equally among group members or burdened by the individual
who initiates it, depending on the cost-sharing rules chosen by the group mem-
bers. Table 1 summarizes the fixed costs and variable costs for each institution.
This table was also presented in the instructions. We will now elaborate on the
details of the institutions.
With communication (mechanism A), group members can simultaneously send
messages to a “blackboard” that every group member can see before making a
contribution decision. The content of the message is semi-specified, and par-
ticipants are required to fill in the blank before they send the message. Every
message they send entails a variable cost of 1 point. They can choose one or more
messages from the following set:
• “I propose we invest (integer number from 0 to 20) points in the project.”
• “I propose we use mechanism A/B/C/none.”
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• “I propose we share the variable costs of mechanism A/C/none.”
Reputation (mechanism B) makes a person’s (term) history tractable and
known to all group members. With reputation, the temporary IDs assigned to
group members are fixed for this term; group member 1 remains group member
1 throughout the term. And subjects see each group member’s record of contri-
bution and payoff in this term, after making contributions. They can thus see six
numbers (the contribution and payoff of each group member) in the first round
of this term and 18 numbers in the last round of this term. Unlike the other two
institutions, reputation does not incur any variable cost. Once it is established
at fixed costs of 3 per round, it keeps working for the entire term without any
further variable costs.
The last institution, punishment (mechanism C), enables group members to
directly reduce others’ payoffs at some costs after they have seen every member’s
contribution and payoffs. The fine-to-fee ratio is 3 in this experiment, follow-
ing the standard practice in public good experiments (Nikiforakis and Normann,
2008). That is, it costs one point to reduce another individual’s payoff by 3 points.
To rule out anti-social punishment behavior, subjects can only punish those who
contribute less than them.3
Subjects are informed of all of the above information in the instructions they
receive (see Appendix B).
Table 2.1: Overview of costs (in points) per treatment
Institution Fixed Cost per round Variable Cost per use
Communication 3 1 per message
Punishment 3 1/3 per unit of deduction
Reputation 3 -
Treatments: Collective-choice rules
Our experiment consists of three treatments, which only differ in the collective-
choice rules employed to translate individual preferences into one collective de-
cision: majority voting (MV), fixed dictatorship (FD), and rotating dictatorship
(RD). The rules of the basic game and the institutions explained in previous sec-
tions apply to all treatments.
3Anti-social punishment widely exists when punishment is possible (Fehr and Gachter, 2000;
Herrmann et al., 2008). We forbid antisocial punishment in order to keep the function of the “punish-
ment” institution straightforward and to avoid inducing more complicated motives and interactions.
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At the beginning of each term, group members choose institutions and the
corresponding cost-sharing rules of each institution individually and simultane-
ously. For each item (or institution) on the menu, they answer two questions:
(1) whether they want this institution to be established with fixed costs that will
be shared by all group members and (2) whether they would like to share the
potential variable cost of that institution, if it is put into use.
In the MV treatment, whether an institution will be established depends on
whether the majority of the group votes yes or no concerning question (1). If the
majority votes yes, the cost-sharing rule will be also determined by majority rule
according to their answers to question (2).
In the FD treatment, one of the group members will be randomly chosen as
the decision maker (fixed dictator) and remains the decision maker throughout
the entire game. In the very first round, all group members are asked to answer
questions (1) and (2) without knowing whether they are the decision maker or
not. After the voting phase in the first round, each subject knows whether he
is assigned as the decision maker or not. Nevertheless, to minimize procedural
differences between the treatments, non-dictators are still required to privately
indicate their preferences over institutions at the beginning of each term, even
though their choices do not affect the institutional outcome.
In the RD treatment, participants take turns to be the decision maker (ro-
tating dictator). The order is randomly determined by the computer. All group
members answer questions (1) and (2) in all six terms without knowing whether
they are going to be the decision maker in that term. Only after the voting phase
will they be informed of whether their choices have been selected and imple-
mented or not. There are six terms, and hence six institutional choices. Sub-
jects know that only two times their decision(s) will actually be implemented as
the collective-choice. If a group member has been selected twice as the decision
maker, she can therefore conclude that her institutional choice would not matter
anymore in later terms.
2.3.2 Procedure
The experiment was conducted at CentERlab at Tilburg University, and it was
programmed using zTree (Fischbacher, 2007). Participants were recruited via
the UvTlab system of Tilburg University. We employed a between-subjects de-
sign. Participants could only participate in one experimental session, and in
each session, only one treatment (i.e. collective-choice rule) was conducted. We
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implemented in total six sessions, with two sessions per treatment.
We start by reading aloud instructions. Subjects are first introduced to the
standard public good game as described in section 3.1.1. A test of their under-
standing of the public good game is performed before entering the next stage
of instruction. Then we introduce the available institutions as described in sec-
tion 3.1.2 and the collective-choice rule used in their collective-decision process.
Subjects can ask questions, which are answered privately. Finally, the experi-
ment starts without any practice round. The complete procedure of the game is
presented in Appendix A.
In each treatment, subjects are randomly matched in fixed groups of three
(partner matching). There are in total 18 rounds, which are divided into six
terms of three rounds each. In rounds 1, 4, 7, 10, 13, 16, groups play a full
Institutional Design Game consisting of two phases: a collective decision phase
and a simultaneous contribution phase. In all other rounds participants skip
the collective decision phase and only make contribution decisions. Every round
participants are randomly (re)assigned an ID number 1, 2 or 3 (except for the
case where they have established reputation institution).
In the collective decision phase, group members choose which institutions
they would like to implement in the next three rounds and the corresponding
cost-sharing rule individually and simultaneously. Their choices are aggregated
into group decisions via the collective-choice rule assigned to the group. At the
end of this collective decision phase, the group decisions are displayed on the
screen and hence known to all group members. Individual votes are not revealed.
Then follows the second phase of simultaneous contribution. Participants
play a standard public game with the institutions that they have chosen them-
selves. The first stage of the contribution phase is the communication stage. Only
groups that have chosen the communication institution are eligible to participate
in this stage. Subjects of eligible groups can choose and fill in the message(s) that
they would like to convey to his/her group members. Not sending any message
is also possible. Messages from each member are shown on the group’s black-
board. In the second stage, participants play the standard public good game and
make their contribution decisions simultaneously. In the succeeding stage, indi-
vidual contribution and payoffs of this round are shown to all group members.
The fourth stage is the punishment stage. If the punishment institution is estab-
lished in a group, participants indicate whom they want to punish and by how
many points. These decisions are made individually and simultaneously. In the
final stage, punishment and final payoffs of each group member in this round
16
are shown on the screen. Groups that have chosen reputation can identify con-
tributions and payoffs of the group member in a term; without reputation this
information cannot be linked to individual group members (only to random IDs).
The monetary payoff of each participant in the experiment is determined by
the sum of individual tokens earned in all 18 rounds plus a show-up fee of 3
euros. 100 tokens are translated into 3 euros.
In total, 114 subjects participated in the experiment (39 in MV, 36 in FD, and
39 in RD), of whom 43% are women. In the questionnaire conducted at the end of
the experiment, around 74% of the subjects claimed that they had participated
in a “similar” experiment. This suggests that these participants generally have
a good understanding of the game, or at least they believe so. Subjects earned on
average 16.9 euros in about 1 hour 15 minutes.
2.3.3 Hypotheses
Our first hypothesis is that collective-choice rules have a direct effect on contri-
bution behavior. The direct effect is reflected in the difference in contribution
behavior by collective-choice rules conditional on having the same institutions.
This hypothesis builds on people’s preference for democratic participation right.
Participation right provides a feeling of inclusion and lends legitimacy to the col-
lective decisions. Being able to participate and decide may increase group mem-
bers’ mental attachment to the selected institutions and hence enhance compli-
ance with the resulting institutions (Arbak and Villeval, 2011; Dal Bó et al., 2010;
Casari and Luini, 2009; Castore and Murnighan, 1978; Frey et al., 2004). In our
setting, majority voting guarantees every group member participation right in
all six terms. With rotating dictatorship, group members share participation
rights equally over all terms, but each group member has decision power only
1/3 of the time. Fixed dictatorship assigns all the decision power to only one of
the three group members, which likely undermines the legitimacy of the selected
institutions. While majority voting is obviously democratic, rotating dictatorship
is arguably democratic, depending on one’s understanding of “democracy”. Based
on these arguments, we formulate the first hypothesis as follows.
Hypothesis 2.1. (Direct effect). Given the same endogenous institution combina-
tion, contributions to the public good are greater with majority voting than with
rotating dictatorship, and are greater with rotating dictatorship than with fixed
dictatorship.
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Our second hypothesis consists of two parts. First, we hypothesize that collective-
choice rules affect the stability of institutional outcomes. Second, the stability
of institutional outcomes in turn affects cooperation behavior. As to the first
part, intuitively, rotating dictatorship is expected to produce the least stable in-
stitutional outcomes. Regarding majority voting, a number of studies use con-
trolled experiments to test the stability of majority rule. They have shown that
the resulting collective decisions under the majority voting framework are not
necessarily predictable and may depend on details of the voting procedure, for
example, agenda setting, or pre-communication (Haney et al., 1992; Hoffman
and Plott, 1983; McKelvey and Ordeshook, 1984; Plott and Levine, 1978; Wil-
son, 1986). Following these results, we hypothesize that institutional outcomes
produced via a fixed dictatorial collective-choice rule are more stable than those
produced via majority voting.
Hypothesis 2.2a. Institutional choices generated under fixed dictatorship are
the most stable among the three collective-choice rules, and those generated under
rotating dictatorship are the least stable.
The second part of the second hypothesis is based on extensive empirical re-
search on the relationship between political stability and economic performance
(Aisen and Veiga, 2013; Alesina et al., 1996; Barro, 1991; Dixit, 2009; Feng,
1997). Literature sometimes finds instability to be the cause of poor economic
performance and sometimes the consequence of it. We therefore expect to ob-
serve a positive correlation between the institutional stability and cooperation
in our setting.
Hypothesis 2.2b. The stability of institutional choices is positively correlated
with cooperation.
Collective-choice rules may also affect the type of institutions groups choose.
As explained in section 1, we cannot formulate a testable hypothesis about the
relationship between collective-choice rules and the type of institutions groups
prefer. Nor can we say anything about the effects of a certain combination of
collective-choice rule and institutional design on cooperation behavior. Therefore,
we remain open to any result that surfaces from our data.
2.4 Results
We first present some general results on subjects’ behavior in the public goods
game, including the performance, contributions and institutional choices. Bear-
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ing these results in mind, we will then proceed to investigate the direct and
indirect effects of the collective-choice rules.
2.4.1 General results
Performance
The first result we are interested in is how well groups perform in self-governance,
or their “performance”. Performance is measured by the earnings of an individ-
ual or a group in the game: subtracting the costs related to the establishment
and usage of institutions from the total profits made in the public goods game.
Performance is the materialized individual or social welfare. For a group, per-
formance is also a net measure of cooperation, broadly considered. It increases
when group members contribute more to the public good, and it decreases when
the group achieves that cooperation level at greater costs.
As a benchmark, if a group never establishes any institution and all group
members contribute nothing to the public good, each individual group member
will earn 360 experimental points over the 18 rounds of the game. Full contribu-
tions without any costs of institutions would yield maximum individual earnings
of 540 points. Figure 2.1 presents the distributions of individual accumulated
earnings (in experimental points, one observation per individual) in each treat-
ment, where the vertical lines are drawn at the mean value. Over all treatments
subjects earn on average 483.2 points, which is an increase of more than 34%
compared to the benchmark earnings of 360 points.
The average earnings of subjects are highest in the FD treatment and lowest
in the RD treatment. As can bee seen in Figure 2.1, the variation in individual
earnings is smaller in the FD treatment than in the other two treatments. Using
independent observations at the group level, Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests show
that average group earnings in the FD treatment are significantly higher than
in the RD treatment (p = 0.05, n1 = 12, n2 = 13), but not significantly higher
than in the MV treatment (p = 0.21, n1 = 12, n2 = 13). Earnings in the MV
and RD treatment do not differ significantly from each other (p = 0.58, n1 = 13,
n2 = 13). Figure 10 in Appendix C presents the earnings in the three treatments
over rounds.
Result 2.1. Total earnings with fixed dictatorship are significantly higher than
with rotating dictatorship.
As group performance depends on how much a group contributes to the pub-
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Figure 2.1: Distribution of individual earnings
lic good and how intensively it uses the institutions a group’s total earnings can
be decomposed into two parts: the profits from the public and private good, and
the costs associated with the usage of institutions. Figure 2.2 and Table 6 (in
Appendix C) give more detailed information on the two parts. In Figure 2.2, the
darker and lighter dots are located at the mean of per round group contributions
and group institution-related costs across terms for the three treatments, respec-
tively. The box-and-whisker plots show the distribution of group earnings in each
treatment across terms.
Figure 2.2 suggests that contributions to the public good play a decisive part
in determining the group performance. Institution-related costs, including the
fixed and variable costs of institutions and the loss from punishment, are rel-
atively small in magnitude. However, both parts contribute to the differences
between treatments.
In the subsequent sections, we look more closely into contribution behavior
and institutional choices.
Contribution behavior
For each treatment, the development of the average group contributions over 18
rounds is shown in Figure 2.3. In all three treatments of our institutional design
game, groups manage to sustain cooperation at a rather high level. Per round
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Figure 2.2: Per round group earnings, group contributions, and group institution-related
costs over terms.
Note: The tails of the dots cover one standard deviation. The bold line in the box repre-
sents the median earnings. The end of the box shows the first and the third quartiles. The
vertical extreme lines show the highest and lowest earnings excluding outliers.
group contributions to the public good are between 28 and 59 points, with an
average group contribution of 44.18 points, which is approximately 73.6% of the
group endowment.
Contributions to the public good do not demonstrate a declining trend over
time. This result is not in line with the stylized fact of declining cooperation
found in repeated public goods experiments (Ledyard, 1994; Fischbacher and
Gachter, 2010), but such a pattern is typically observed in public good games
with punishment. In the FD treatment, cooperation even seems to be climbing
up until round 12. In the very last term, we observe a sharp falling of group
contributions in the FD and MV treatment, which suggests that cooperation in
previous rounds is more of a strategic play rather than purely driven by social
preferences.
Interestingly, we observe a declining trend within terms in the MV and RD
treatment. In these two treatments subjects contribute significantly less in the
third round of a term than in the first round of that same term (both treat-
ments p < 0.01, n = 13); we may call this the “draining” effect. In contrast, they
contribute significantly more upon entering a new term, compared with their
contributions in the last round of the previous term (both treatments p < 0.01,
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Figure 2.3: Group contributions over rounds
n = 13); we call this the “boosting” effect.4 Furthermore, we find that a change in
the institutions between two consecutive terms is positively correlated with the
boosting effect and the draining effect. That is, a new set of institutions gives
a boost to cooperation, but at the same time cooperation declines more than if
the institutions do not change. This suggests a correlation between the stability
of institutions and the stability of cooperation behavior. We will consider this in
more detail in Section 4.1.2.
Turning to the differences in cooperation across treatments, Figure 2.3 shows
that groups in the FD treatment constantly and consistently have higher con-
tribution levels than MV and RD groups with the exception of some of the very
last rounds. This can also be seen from Table 7 in Appendix C, which shows
the average contributions per term and treatment as well as results of compar-
isons between treatments. Average group contributions in the FD treatment are
about 20% higher than in the other two treatments. Although the differences
are substantial in most terms, only the differences between the two treatments
with dictatorship are significant in several terms while the differences between
4This boosting effect resembles the so-called restart effect (Andreoni, 1988; Cookson, 2000). In
our experiment the (new) term was not unexpectedly announced, however, but announced ex ante.
Furthermore, it is not a pure restart effect as the rules in the new term may be different, depending
on the institution combination selected.
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contribution with majority voting and with fixed dictatorship are not.
Result 2.2. In early terms and over all six terms, groups with fixed dictatorship
contribute significantly more than those with rotating dictatorship. Groups with
majority voting contribute less than FD and more than RD, but neither difference
is statistically significant.
Institutional choices
We will first look at the overall institutional choices in all six terms. The fre-
quency of each institution combination chosen is displayed in Figure 2.4. Of
in total 228 group institutional choices (38 groups x 6 terms), 51.32% are “no
institution”. The most frequently selected institutions are (only) punishment
(14.9%) and (only) communication (11.4%). Then it follows with the combination
of punishment and communication (8.3%) and the combination of all three insti-
tutions (6.6%). Participants show little interest in reputation, neither alone nor
combined with other institutions. The reason could be that reputation in this
experiment is rather weak while still costly.5
If we look at the institutional choices over time, groups seem to prefer commu-
nication in the beginning of the game and then turn to punishment when they
approach the end of the game; see Figure 2.5 which shows choices of institu-
tions in the first term (top panel) and last term (bottom panel). One explanation
could be that in early rounds, communication may be a useful and powerful tool
to build up group morale and mutual trust, while in later rounds the credible
threat offered via punishment is more useful. The patterns observed in Figure
2.5 offer some support for such a “carrots first, then sticks” conjecture: between
terms 1 and 6 the percentages of groups using communication, either alone or
combined with other institutions, decreases strongly (from 66% to 15.8%) while
the use of punishment increases (from 26.3% to 45%). The willingness to share
the variable costs of both institutions shows a similar development. This also
suggests that subjects are (only) willing to pay for the institutions they vote for.
When comparing the use of institutions across treatments, it turns out FD
groups use institutions less frequently (24 times) than MV groups (40 times) and
RD groups (47 times). Less institution usage means lower institution-related
costs, which contributes to the better performance of FD groups, as was shown
in the previous section.
5Rockenbach and Wolff (2016) find that institution designers tend to provide aggregate contribu-
tion information, and leave individual information vague. Our findings do not conflict theirs.
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Figure 2.4: Group institutional choices over all six terms
Do collective-choice rules also affect the type of institutions chosen by groups?
We compare the first round institutional choices across treatments since they
are made individually and simultaneously before any form of interaction. The
individual institutional choices in the first round are presented in Figure 11,
Appendix C. There is no evidence that initial preferences over institutions dif-
fer given different collective-choice rules. Also individual preferences over cost-
sharing rules, i.e whether group members are willing to share the variable costs
of institutions, do not differ significantly across treatments. Therefore, we find
no evidence showing that different collective-choice rules might induce different
preferences over institutions.
2.4.2 Direct and indirect effects of collective-choice rules
We now test our hypotheses regarding the direct and indirect effects of collective-
choice rules.
Direct effect
The direct effect of collective-choice rules is the influence of these rules on contri-
bution behavior conditional on institutions. To test whether there is difference in
contributions between treatments, given the same institution, we run a regres-
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Figure 2.5: Group institutional choices in term 1 and term 6
sion on individual contribution behavior in the first round.6
We estimate three specifications using a censored tobit model. The first spec-
ification takes the form
xij1 = – + —1MV + —2RD + ‘i1 (2.1)
where xij1 is the contribution to the public good of individual i in group j,
round 1. MV and RD are dummy variables indicating whether the individual
is in treatment MV and whether the individual is in treatment RD respectively.
The benchmark treatment in the regression is FD. The second specification is
identical to the first one, except that it also takes into consideration the institu-
tional choices of a group in round 1
xij1 = – + —1MV + —2RD + ”1COMj1 + ”2PUNj1 + ”3REPj1 + ‘i1 (2.2)
where COMj1, PUNj1, and REPj1 represent the establishment of the 3 available
institutions in group j, term 1. Our last specification controls for more institu-
tional features and some individual characteristics, in addition to the second
6Using only first-round data is a rather strict but clean test, as it rules out path dependency
which may occur when using data from all rounds. Tobit is used because a substantial fraction of
contributions is at the boundaries, 0 or 20.
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specification
xij1 =– + —1MV + —2RD + ”1COMj1 + ”2PUNj1
+ ”3REPj1 + ‡1Share COMj1 + ‡2Share PUNj1
+ ÷1genderi + ÷2experiencei + ‘i1 (2.3)
where Share COMj1 and Share PUNj1 denote whether the variable costs of
communication and punishment are shared among group members, respectively.
experiencei is a dummy variable denoting whether the individual has experience
in similar experiments, and gender is a dummy variable taking value 1 for fe-
males.
Results are reported in Table 4.1. The results show that subjects in treat-
ment FD contribute more than in the other two treatments and significantly so
in treatment RD, in line with Result 2.2. This positive effect of fixed dictatorship
on contributions persists in all model specifications, so even after controlling for
institutions. We also find that the establishment of communication raises the
contribution level significantly. Of the other variables only gender has a signifi-
cant effect; women contribute significantly more than men in the first round.
Result 2.3. Fixed dictatorship has an immediate and significantly positive direct
effect on contributions compared with rotating dictatorship. Fixed dictatorship
also has a positive direct effect on contributions compared with majority voting
but it is not statistically significant. Contributions with majority voting do not
differ from contributions with rotating dictators significantly.
Our first hypothesis is thus not supported. We do not find a positive direct
effect of democratic collective-choice rules on cooperation. On the contrary, the
direct effect, if any, works in the opposite direction as predicted, with highest
contributions with fixed dictatorship.
Indirect effect
To test our second hypothesis, we need a measure of the stability of groups’ insti-
tutional choices over time. Formally, let p = (pCOM , pREP , pP UN ) be an ordered
triple in a 3-dimensional Euclidean space, with each component p œ {0, 1} rep-
resenting the individual or group choice on the establishment of one institution.
For example, pjt = (1, 0, 1) indicates that the institutional choice of group j in
term t is communication and punishment. We then compute the linear distance
between the institutional choices in two consecutive terms and denote it as the
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MV ≠5.964 ≠3.720 ≠3.262
(5.269) (4.716) (4.633)
















logSigma 2.889úúú 2.714úúú 2.676úúú
(0.148) (0.145) (0.145)
Constant 31.821úúú 17.981úúú 12.094úú
(4.548) (4.172) (5.235)
Observations 114 114 114
Akaike Inf. Crit. 402.159 382.923 385.595
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 413.104 402.077 415.694
Note: úp<0.1; úúp<0.05; úúúp<0.01
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group instability index indexjt = Îpj,t≠1, pj,tÎ. The overall instability of group j’s
institutional choices over time is defined by adding up the instability index from
term 2 to term 6: instabilityj =
q
tœ2,...6Îpj,t≠1, pj,tÎ.7
To examine the stability of institutions we first present for each treatment a
complete and detailed picture of how institutions evolve over time, see Figures
2.6, 2.7, and 2.8. On theses graphs, each sub-plot shows the institutional choices
of one group over six terms. Note that although the combinations on the vertical
axis are not completely ordered, broadly speaking higher points correspond to
more institutions. The color of dots denotes the instability index of the institu-
tional choice in a term. A red dot suggests that institutions have changed a lot
from previous term while a blue dot signals stability.
Figure 2.6: Evolution of institutions in treatment MV
Visual inspection shows that institutional choices of the FD groups are the
most “stable” as the graph of treatment FD looks more blue. 7 out of 12 FD
groups converge to no institutions immediately after the second term. In sharp
contrast, the RD groups seem to be struggling with designing their (best) in-
stitutions. There is frequent and seemingly random switching among different
institution combinations. What happens in the MV groups is somewhere in be-
tween the case of the FD and RD groups. The results of Mann-Whitney U tests
7Because all individuals are asked to indicate their institutional choices in every term, we could
compute an instability index at the individual level, but we focus on group (in)stability.
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Figure 2.7: Evolution of institutions in treatment FD
Figure 2.8: Evolution of institutions in treatment RD
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on the instability index confirm that institutional choices in FD and MV groups
are indeed significantly more stable than in RD groups (both differences p < 0.01,
n = 12 for FD, n = 13 for MV and RD) while the difference between FD and MV
groups is not significant (p = 0.74).
However, simple comparisons of the overall instability across treatments may
suffer from endogeneity problems. For example, among the many factors that
may influence a group’s institutional design, cooperation history is an important
one. A group might decide to try a new set of institutions because its members
are currently not contributing enough. At the same time, low cooperation might
be traced back to the direct effect of collective-choice rules in the very beginning.
Therefore, instability could stem from the direct effect of collective-choice rules,
rather than the inherent instability of collective-choice rules.
Ideally, we want to control for all other factors which are possibly correlated
with collective-choice rules and which could affect institutional choices, such as
previous cooperation history and group morale, and only vary the collective-
choice rule. One way to achieve this is to construct counterfactual group in-
stitutional choices. A counterfactual group institutional choice is the institu-
tional choice a group would have selected if its members’ preferences were ag-
gregated via a different collective-choice rule. We can construct these counter-
factual choices by exploiting the individual institutional choices of subjects in
treatment MV. Because all the decisions in this treatment are made in an in-
centivized manner, the individual institutional choices can be aggregated ex post
in whichever way we want. We use each individual’s six institutional choices to
compute a counterfactual FD instability index, as if they were the dictators. This
gives us three counterfactual FD indices for each group, one per subject. As to
the counterfactual RD index, we first generate all possible permutations of ran-
dom dictators for a group according to our rotating rule specified in section 3. We
compute the counterfactual RD instability index in each permutation and then
take the average of the counterfactual instability index for all permutations. The
counterfactual instability indices constructed in this way allow us to do paired
difference test on the stability of institutions across treatments while keeping
other things constant.
The results of these exercises provide strong evidence showing that institu-
tional choices produced by rotating dictatorship are significantly less stable than
by fixed dictatorship (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p < 0.01, n = 39) and signifi-
cantly less stable than by majority voting (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p < 0.01,
n = 13). But there is no evidence suggesting any difference in stability between
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majority voting and fixed dictatorship (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = 0.844,
n = 39).
Result 2.4. Institutional choices generated by rotating dictators are significantly
less stable than those generated via majority voting or fixed dictatorship. The
stability of institutional choices does not differ between majority voting and fixed
dictatorship.
Next, we explore the relationship between instability and cooperation (Hy-
pothesis 2.2b). We estimate the following specification for all groups using a
linear model8 and using data from all rounds
Xjt =– + ⁄instabilityjt + “Xj,t≠1 + ◊t + ”1COMjt + ”2PUNjt + ”3REPjt
+ —1MV + —2RD + ‘jt (2.4)
where Xjt is the per round contributions of group j averaged over the three
rounds in term t. instabilityjt is the instability index which measures how much
the institutional choice(s) of group j change from term t ≠ 1 to term t, as defined
previously. COMjt, PUNjt, and REPjt stand for the establishment of the three
institutions in group j, term t. ◊t is term fixed effects, capturing the trend of
cooperation over time. And MV and RD are dummy variables indicating the
collective-choice rule group j is using.
Table 2.3 presents the results. The instability of institutional choice has a
negative effect on group contributions. The magnitude of this effect is relatively
small but significant. The establishment of punishment significantly increases
group contributions by 21.6 points, and reputation decreases group contributions
by 6.2 points. The results combined with the group institutional choices pre-
sented in the previous section justify our argument that institutional design can
be seen as a problem-solving process: Groups try to find out which institutions
work best in terms of promoting cooperation. Institutions that work (punish-
ment) are chosen more frequently, while institutions that don’t work lose their
places. The results also show that group contributions are highly correlated with
contributions in the last term, with a coefficient of about 0.66.9
Result 2.5. The instability of institutional choice decreases subsequent group
contributions.
8The dependent variable here is group contributions, which are never censored. Therefore, we
use a linear model instead of a censored tobit model.
9The results do not depend on the specifications; the signs and significance of variables are very
similar if group contributions in the last term are not included.
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Note: úp<0.1; úúp<0.05; úúúp<0.01
Our second hypothesis is thus partially supported. Rotating dictatorship pro-
duces unstable institutional choices, compared with majority voting and fixed
dictatorship. Instability is associated with a lower cooperation level.
2.5 Discussions: What drives the direct effect
Result 2.3 offers no support for Hypothesis 2.1, which stated that democratic
participation right would increase compliance with the selected institutions and
results in higher contributions. In this section, we try to explore why this may
be the case. Among the many potential explanations we focus on two, namely
communication and leadership. The first conjecture points to the use and in par-
ticular the content of communication as a coordination device. The messages
subjects exchange in the communication phase may account for the difference
between FD and RD groups. A second conjecture is that the dictators in the FD
treatment act (more) as de facto leaders. They might take their responsibilities
in promoting group cooperation by sending messages and making larger contri-
butions than non-dictators. As a result, the whole group benefits from having
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a leading figure, even though they cannot identify which member is the leader.
We find some evidence supporting the first conjecture and evidence against the
second.
2.5.1 The usage and the content of communication
In section 4, we have shown that in the first round communication increases
contributions to the public good. Now we consider in more detail the usage and
the content of the messages in this round.
The first three rows of Table 2.4 give a summary of the usage of communi-
cation across treatments: the percentage of groups that have established com-
munication, the percentage of individuals who send any message at all, and the
number of messages sent sorted by content. Fixed dictators choose to establish
communication more frequently and send more messages than groups in the MV
and RD treatments. Remember that the content of a messages is semi-specified.
It can be a proposal for certain amount of contribution to the public good, a pro-
posal for the establishment of certain institution combinations, or a proposal for
a certain cost-sharing rule. Table 2.4 also shows that the types of messages sent
are similar across treatments.
Table 2.4: Usage of communication in round 1
MV FD RD
% groups using communication 61.5 75 61.5
% individuals sending any message 51.3 58.3 51.3
NO. messages sent 39 38 33
message about contribution 18 19 20
message about institution 13 10 7
message about sharing-rule 8 9 6
What might matter more than the number of messages sent is the specific
content of the message, and the proposals for contribution in particular. Table
2.5 presents the frequency of the proposed amount of contribution in round 1. We
immediately notice that in the RD treatment less people propose to contribute
the full endowment to the public good. Results from Fisher’s exact tests confirm
that the proposals for contribution are significantly different between MV and
RD groups (p = 0.08, n = 38), and between FD and RD groups (p = 0.04, n = 39).
Previous findings from economic experiments demonstrate that a large frac-
tion of the population can be categorized as conditional cooperator (Fischbacher
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Table 2.5: Frequency of individual proposed contribution in round 1
proposed amount MV FD RD
0 0 0 1
3 0 1 0
5 0 0 1
8 0 1 0
10 1 0 5
15 0 1 1
20 17 16 12
N 18 19 20
et al., 2001; Fischbacher and Gachter, 2010; Gächter and Renner, 2018; Neuge-
bauer et al., 2009; Thöni and Volk, 2018): they cooperate only if they expect
others to cooperate. Seeing selfish signals, group members may lower their ex-
pectations of how much others would contribute, and this may result in a lower
group cooperation level. Results of a regression of actual contributions on the
minimal proposed amount of contribution in a group (not reported here) suggest
that a one point decrease in the minimal proposed amount of contribution de-
creases actual contributions significantly, by 1.07 point on average (p < 0.01).
The fact that group members in the RD treatment observe less (very) positive
signals may explain, at least partly, why RD groups cooperate at a lower level.
2.5.2 The leadership effect
To examine whether some sort of leadership effect (Moxnes and Van der Heij-
den, 2003; Gächter and Renner, 2018; Güth et al., 2007) exists and whether it is
stronger in the FD treatment than in the RD treatment, we compare the behav-
iors of dictators and non-dictators in all rounds with communication.
First, dictators are more willing to send messages to their group members
than non-dictators when communication is possible. This finding also holds for
both FD and RD sub-samples separately. But the dictators in the FD treatment
are not more willing to communicate than those in the RD treatment. Second,
dictators in both FD and RD treatments propose a higher amount of contribu-
tion than non-dictators do, but the contribution proposals by the dictators in
the FD treatment and in the RD treatment are indistinguishable. Finally, dic-
tators behave similarly as non-dictators in terms of actual contributions to the
public good in treatments FD and RD. Taken together, this implies that there in-
deed seems to be a “leadership” effect in both treatments with dictatorship, albeit
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weak. The dictators are more willing to communicate and propose larger amount
of contributions but are not actually contributing more than non-dictators. More
importantly, we find no evidence that this leadership effect is stronger in the
FD treatment than in the RD treatment. Therefore, the higher cooperation level
observed in the FD treatment compared with the RD treatment cannot be at-
tributed to a (stronger) leadership effect in the first treatment.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper studies the role of collective-choice rules in a problem-solving deci-
sion environment where groups can exploit the possibility of institutional design
to achieve self-governance. We test if collective-choice rules directly affect coop-
eration after controlling for institutions and if collective-choice rules indirectly
affect cooperation through the stability of institutional choices. Specifically, we
study majority voting, dictatorship, and rotating dictatorship. The Institutional
Design Game we use is based on a standard public goods game. Groups repeat-
edly select institutions they would like to implement via a given collective-choice
rule and play the self-tailored public goods game with the chosen institutions.
Institutions are costly.
Our main findings are: (1) Cooperation level is not higher when the insti-
tutions are chosen via a democratic rule than when the same institutions are
chosen via a non-democratic rule. On the contrary, groups with a fixed dicta-
tor cooperate at a higher level than those with rotating dictators, conditional on
institutions. (2) Institutional choices chosen by majority voting or by a fixed dic-
tator are more stable over time than those chosen by rotating dictators. (3) The
instability of institutions is associated with lower cooperation level.
Previous literature has established an “endogeneity premium” (Dal Bó et al.,
2010), namely that institutions chosen by the subjects themselves are more ef-
fective than the same institutions imposed on them. The “endogeneity premium”
is widely interpreted as the merit of democratic participation in group decision-
making. But it could also be that endogenous institutions work better because
they are chosen by in-group members whose payoffs are at stake. We exclude this
possibility by comparing institutions that are all chosen by subjects themselves
but through democratic or non-democratic rules. We do not find evidence of a
“democracy premium” (institutions chosen via democratic rules are more effec-
tive than chosen via non-democratic rules). Our results do not refute the findings
of an “endogeneity premium”, but suggest further investigation into the underly-
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ing mechanisms through which democratic participation right is transmitted to
higher cooperation.
Our second finding concerns the stability of collective decisions in a complex
problem-solving setting where the consequences of these decisions are uncer-
tain and individual preferences are not necessarily fixed. In the presence of this
complexity, one does not expect widespread agreement on the optimal collective
choice. Therefore, collective choice is likely exposed to greater variance when
the decision rights are more dispersed. We show that indeed decisions are most
unstable when they are made by individuals on a rotating basis. Yet we detect
no significant difference in the stability of institutional choices between majority
voting and fixed dictatorship. Future work could look at whether the difference
in stability persists as the size of group grows and as the complexity of decision
environment increases. Finally, in our environment, unstable institutions is not
constructive to cooperation.
Taken together, our results indicate that certain collective-choice rules may
matter for the effectiveness of collective decisions. It helps to think about the
value of democratic participation right, the cost of instability, and the possible
tradeoff between the two before a group sets the collective-choice rule for making
collective decisions.
Of course, there are several questions remaining to be answered. For ex-
ample, concerning the direct effect, it is a bit surprising that individuals in the
treatment of rotating dictatorship send more selfish signals than those in other
treatments. It could be a coincidence given the relatively small sample. Alter-
natively, one may suspect that subjects with rotating dictators anticipate the
instability of their institutional environment and that the anticipation of insta-
bility already hurts their willingness to fully cooperate. As to the indirect effect,
our setting suffers from endogeneity issue as many empirical studies do. If we
want to learn more about the causal relationship between stability and cooper-
ation, we need an experimental design which is more tailored to this purpose.
Finally, the direct and indirect effects observed here may serve as starting points
for studying and better understanding the role of collective-choice rules. It is not
clear, for example, whether the impact of collective-choice rules will be stronger
or weaker, as the decision environment becomes more complex. All these aspects
may be examined in further research.
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Appendix A. Experiment Procedure
Figure 9: Complete experimental procedure
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Appendix B. Instructions
Welcome and thanks for your participation. You receive e3 for having shown
up on time. If you read these instructions carefully, you can earn more. Your
earnings will be paid out to you in cash immediately after the experiment.
It is strictly forbidden to communicate with the other participants during the
experiment. If you have any questions or concerns, please raise your hand. We
will answer your questions individually.
The experiment consists of 18 rounds. It is divided into 6 terms. Each consists
of 3 rounds. You will interact with two other participants. The three of you form
a group that will remain the same in all 18 rounds. You will never know which
of the other participants are in your group.
The sum of the 18 round payoffs will determine your final earnings. 100
points in the experiment are converted to 3 Euros: 100 points = e3.
Basic Game
This is the game that you play every round. Each participant will be (re)assigned
as either Member 1, Member 2, or Member 3. This identity changes every round.
In each round, each of you receive 20 points. In the following, we shall refer
to this amount as your endowment. Your task is to decide how much of your
endowment you want to invest in a project. After investment, the rest of
your endowment is kept for yourself.
One POINT, no matter invested by whom, in the project gives 0.5 POINT
to each member in your group. Therefore how much you earn from the project
depends on both your own investment and your group members’ investment. To
calculate how much you earn from the project:
1. Investments into the project from the three group members are added up
as the total group investment.
2. Each member in this group receives half amount of the total group invest-
ment.
The amount that you keep for yourself remains the same. Your profit is there-
fore the sum of the following two parts:
Profit = 0.5 * total group investment + the amount that you keep for yourself
You and your group members make this decision at the same time without
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knowing others’ choices. The individual investments and profits of all group
members will be shown to you at the end of each round.
Now please look at the screen and answer a few questions. These questions
aim at making sure that you understand the game. They do not influence your
earnings. If you have any questions, please raise your hand.
Possible Extensions
As mentioned, the experiment will consist of 6 terms of 3 rounds. At the
beginning of each term, you are able to change the rules of the basic game by
using one or more of the following three Mechanisms:
Mechanism A: It is used before investment. You are able to exchange mes-
sages with your group members before making your investment. There are at
most three pieces of message you can send, which will be listed below.
Mechanism B: It is used after investment, when investments and profits are
shown to you. You are able to see not only the investments and profits in the cur-
rent round, but also the history of investments and profits of your group mem-
bers in the previous rounds starting from this term. Your identity (Member 1,
Member 2, or Member 3) will not change during this term.
Mechanism C: It is used after seeing your investments and profits. You are
able to assign points to other group members to reduce their earnings. Each
point assigned to a group member will reduce the earnings of this group member
by 3 points. You can only assign points to those who invest less than you.
To be able to use these Mechanisms, you will have to pay for the fixed costs as
a group. Each Mechanism costs each member of the group 3 points in this term.
That is, each of you pay 1 point per round in the term in which the Mechanism
is used.
Additionally, Mechanism A and C might incur variable costs, which depend
on your actual usage. Within Mechanism A, the variable cost of each piece of
message is 1 point. Within Mechanism C, the variable cost of each assigned
point is 1 point. For example, if Member 1 assigns 1 point to Member 2, the
variable cost of such action is 1 point, whereas the earnings of Member 2 will be
reduced by 3 points.
Your group can choose to share the variable costs of the Mechanism A and
C equally among all group members or not. If your group chooses to share the
variables costs, then no matter who sends a message or who assigns points to
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others, the variable costs of such actions will be shared equally by all group
members. Otherwise the costs of sending a message or assigning points to others
will only be burdened by the member who takes the action.
The following table gives you a summary of the costs of each Mechanism.
Your task is to decide:
At the beginning of each term
1. With regard to each of the three Mechanisms, would you like it to be used
in your group? (Yes/No)
2. With regard to Mechanism A and Mechanism C, would you like the variable
costs to be shared equally by all group members? (Yes/No)
In each round
3. (If applicable) Do you have any messages to send? If yes, what would you
send?
There are three pieces of message to choose from. You need to fill in the blank
before sending. You can choose more than one of them:
• “I propose that we invest (integer number from 0 to 20) points in the
project.”
• “I propose that we later use Mechanism (A/B/C/none).”
• “I propose that we later share the variable cost of Mechanism
(A/C/none).”
4. (If applicable) How many points you want to assign to those who invest
less than you?
[FOR MV ONLY] Whether a Mechanism will be actually used depends on
whether a majority in your group agree to use it. That is, if two or more group
members vote yes for a Mechanism, it will be used in the following term (three
rounds) and all group members will pay for its fixed costs.
For Mechanism A and C, whether the variable costs would be shared equally
by all group members depends on whether a majority in your group agree to it.
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[FOR FD ONLY] One of the group members will be randomly assigned the
role of decision maker throughout the 6 terms. Whether a Mechanism will be
actually used and whether the variable costs will be shared equally totally de-
pend on the decision maker’s choice. You are informed of your role after all group
members have made their choices regarding the Mechanisms in term 1.
If you are not the decision maker, you are still able to indicate your prefer-
ences although your choices will not affect the outcome.
[FOR RD ONLY] In each term, one group member will be randomly as-
signed the role of decision maker. Whether a Mechanism will be actually used
and whether the variable costs will be shared equally totally depend on the deci-
sion maker’s choice. Each of the group members will become the decision maker
exactly twice in the six terms. You are informed of your role only after all group
members have made their choices regarding the Mechanisms.
If you are not the decision maker, you are still able to indicate your prefer-
ences although your choices will not influence the outcome.
How is the game played?
The procedure of the game is shown in the following picture. (Only the first
three terms are presented).
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Appendix C. Additional results
Performance over time
We present the average group performance over time of different treatments in
Figure 10. The benchmark group earnings are 60 points per round. Figure 10
shows that on average, groups in all treatments manage to earn more than the
benchmark in all rounds. In the FD treatment, the average group performance
follows a hump-shape pattern. In the MV and RD treatments, there are ups
and downs over time with no obvious trend. Groups in treatment FD on average
outperform those in treatments MV and RD most of the time.
Figure 10: Group earnings over rounds
Decomposition of group performance
Table 6 shows that FD groups on average earn 7.83 more points than RD groups,
of which 4.19 points come from the profit side and 3.64 come from the cost side.
Average per term group contributions
Table 7 shows the average per term group contributions. Subjects in the FD
treatment contribute more than those in the RD treatment in earlier terms. The
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Table 6: Decomposition of group performance
Earnings Costs Profits
MV FD RD MV FD RD MV FD RD
Term 1 81.28 86.36 79.65 4.41 5.55 8.78 76.88 80.81 70.87
Term 2 82.14 85.57 81.88 8.92 5.14 10.57 73.23 80.43 71.32
Term 3 83.29 86.39 78.18 5.18 0.94 4.20 78.12 85.45 73.98
Term 4 80.86 88.69 80.73 1.85 2.99 2.21 79.01 85.70 78.52
Term 5 78.87 82.33 81.88 4.18 0.58 4.15 74.69 81.76 77.73
Term 6 79.49 79.71 81.56 2.26 2.28 9.38 77.23 77.44 72.18
Avg. 80.99 84.84 80.65 4.46 2.91 6.55 76.53 81.93 74.10
contributions of FD groups are also consistently higher than those in treatment
MV, but the differences are not statistically significant.
Table 7: Group contributions over terms
Group contributions
MV FD RD
Term 1 42.56 52.72‡ 39.31‡
Term 2 44.28 51.14 43.77
Term 3 46.59 52.78† 36.36†
Term 4 41.72 57.39† 41.46†
Term 5 37.74 44.67 43.77
Term 6 38.97 39.42 43.13
Avg. 41.98 49.69‡ 41.30‡
Notes. Two-sided Mann-Whitney U tests. † Significant difference (p < 0.1)
between FD and RD. ‡ Significant difference (p < 0.05) between FD and RD.
First round individual institutional choices
As shown in Figure 11, the initial preference of individuals over institutions does
not differ across treatments (p = 0.412, n = 114). It suggests that collective-choice
rules do not affect the type of institutions people choose to use.
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Herrmann, B., Thöni, C., and Gächter, S. (2008). Antisocial punishment across
societies. Science, 319(5868):1362–1367.
Hoffman, E. and Plott, C. R. (1983). Pre-meeting discussions and the possibility
of coalition-breaking procedures in majority rule committees. Public Choice,
40(1):21–39.
Kamei, K. (2016). Democracy and resilient pro-social behavioral change: an ex-
perimental study. Social Choice and Welfare, 47(2):359–378.
Ledyard, J. O. (1994). Public goods: A survey of experimental research.
Markussen, T., Putterman, L., and Tyran, J.-R. (2013). Self-organization for
collective action: An experimental study of voting on sanction regimes. The
Review of Economic Studies, 81(1):301–324.
REFERENCES 47
McKelvey, R. D. and Ordeshook, P. C. (1984). An experimental study of the effects
of procedural rules on committee behavior. The Journal of Politics, 46(1):182–
205.
Moxnes, E. and Van der Heijden, E. (2003). The effect of leadership in a public
bad experiment. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 47(6):773–795.
Neugebauer, T., Perote, J., Schmidt, U., and Loos, M. (2009). Selfish-biased con-
ditional cooperation: On the decline of contributions in repeated public goods
experiments. Journal of Economic Psychology, 30(1):52–60.
Nikiforakis, N. and Normann, H.-T. (2008). A comparative statics analysis of
punishment in public-good experiments. Experimental Economics, 11(4):358–
369.
Nitzan, S. and Paroush, J. (1982). Optimal decision rules in uncertain dichoto-
mous choice situations. International Economic Review, pages 289–297.
Plott, C. R. and Levine, M. E. (1978). A model of agenda influence on committee
decisions. The American Economic Review, 68(1):146–160.
Potters, J., Sefton, M., and Vesterlund, L. (2005). After you—endogenous se-
quencing in voluntary contribution games. Journal of Public Economics,
89(8):1399–1419.
Riker, W. H. (1980). Implications from the disequilibrium of majority rule for the
study of institutions. American Political Science Review, 74(2):432–446.
Rivas, M. F. and Sutter, M. (2011). The benefits of voluntary leadership in exper-
imental public goods games. Economics Letters, 112(2):176–178.
Rockenbach, B. and Wolff, I. (2016). Designing institutions for social dilemmas.
German Economic Review, 17(3):316–336.
Shapley, L. and Grofman, B. (1984). Optimizing group judgmental accuracy in
the presence of interdependencies. Public Choice, 43(3):329–343.
Sigmund, K., De Silva, H., Traulsen, A., and Hauert, C. (2010). Social learning
promotes institutions for governing the commons. Nature, 466(7308):861–863.
Sorkin, R. D., Hays, C. J., and West, R. (2001). Signal-detection analysis of group
decision making. Psychological review, 108(1):183.
48
Sutter, M., Haigner, S., and Kocher, M. G. (2010). Choosing the carrot or the
stick? endogenous institutional choice in social dilemma situations. The Re-
view of Economic Studies, 77(4):1540–1566.
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Chapter 3
The relativity of moral
judgments
3.1 Introduction
People are constantly making judgments as to whether an action, a motive, or
a person is kind or unkind. They evaluate the kindness of the available options
and derive utility from doing good and disutility from doing bad beyond monetary
payoffs (Andreoni, 1990; Crumpler and Grossman, 2008). They also evaluate
the kindness of whom they interact with and reciprocate based on those moral
judgments in social interactions (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Henrich et al.,
2006; Nowak and Sigmund, 2005).
Economic literature often sees moral judgments as static and internal: one
evaluates an action or a person who chooses that action solely based on how
she perceives the nature of the action. Thus, moral judgments are invariant to
other external factors, such as the actions of other people in the same decision
environment 1. For instance, in Abeler et al. (2019); Gneezy et al. (2018), moral
judgments about a person are modeled as a function of whether this person lies
or not. This one-to-one relation may not hold true in a social environment in
which more than one decision maker is involved.
This paper examines whether moral judgments are relative, that is, whether
moral judgments about a decision maker depend on a reference action. Such
1An exception is Cubitt et al. (2011), in which they show that moral judgments of a free rider
depend strongly on others’ behaviour and how people perceive the nature and the intensity of the
behavior responds to features of the whole situation, not just the consequences of the judged behavior.
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dependence may result from a contrast effect and/or from changes of perceived
social norms, which is later referred to as a norm-shifting effect. The contrast ef-
fect, which has been found in various domains (Conway Dato-on and Dahlstrom,
2003; Hartzmark and Shue, 2018; Kenrick and Gutierres, 1980; Pepitone and
DiNubile, 1976), makes a moral action seems more moral and an immoral action
more immoral when they are in contrast than when they are judged in isolation.
The norm-shifting effect proposes that others’ actions affect moral judgments by
shifting the perceptions about social norms. By observing a subset of decision
makers, people sample and make inference about what most people do, i.e. the
descriptive norm, and even about how much the relevant group approves of the
actions, i.e. the injunctive norm (Bicchieri et al., 2020; Eriksson et al., 2015; Kel-
ley, 1971; Lindström et al., 2018; McGraw, 1985; Trafimow et al., 2001; Welch
et al., 2005). People’s perceived social norms change as they observe different be-
havior, which may in turn alter how they judge the decision maker. Put simply,
the contrast effect makes a good action look better, while the norm-shifting effect
makes a common action look better.
The framework of this study suggests that, a bit unexpectedly, the contrast
effect and the norm-shifting effect of a reference action do not always work in
the same direction, and thus the reference action may have asymmetric effect
on judgments about moral decision makers and immoral decision makers. As
a simply example of the two effects working against each other, a moral action
seems better when it is contrasted by an immoral action, but on the other hand,
it is worse because it’s less common. The overall effect of a reference action
on moral judgments is therefore unknown. As an example of the two effects
working in alignment, an immoral action is worse when it is contrasted by a
moral action and even worse because it is less common. In this case, we can
predict the direction of the effect of a reference action.
In the experiment of this study, subjects are assigned one of the two roles in
the experiment: a decision maker or an evaluator. Decision makers choose be-
tween two options in a binary dictator game simultaneously and independently:
either they share ten euros equally between themselves and their paired subjects
or they take seven euros for themselves and leave two euros to the paired sub-
ject. Evaluators are fully informed of the decision environment. They observe the
choices of two random decision makers and judge one of the decision makers; the
other decision maker’s choice is naturally the reference point. I use two measures
of moral judgment: a behavioral measure and an explicit measure. After observ-
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ing two choices, evaluators immediately allocate a number of real-effort tasks2
to the decision maker without incurring any cost. Assigning the real-effort to the
decision maker can be regarded as a form of punishment because it is meaning-
less, boring, and time-consuming. Doing these tasks benefits neither the decision
makers nor the experimenter. Therefore, the number of real-effort task assigned
to the decision maker is used as a behavioral measure of moral judgments.3 Addi-
tionally, evaluators are asked to judge the decision maker along eight personality
traits, which gives me the explicit measure of moral judgment. To separate the
contrast effect and the norm-shifting effect, I elicit the evaluators’ beliefs about
the descriptive norm and the injunctive norm in an incentive compatible manner
before and after they observe decision makers’ choices.
I find that moral judgments indeed depend on the reference action and such
dependence is asymmetric for judgments about moral and immoral decision mak-
ers. In particular, immoral decision makers are punished more harshly if the
reference choice is moral than if it is immoral due to a contrast effect. The pun-
ishment moral decision makers inflicted does not vary with the reference choice.
Moral judgments do not depend on the perceived descriptive norm.
This paper adds to the literature on how previous experience shapes pref-
erences and values. Kahneman et al. (1986) use hypothetical questions to show
that previous transactions serve as reference points and people judge the fairness
of prices by the standard of reference points. They believe the psychological ba-
sis of such phenomenon is that people adapt to what they observe and eventually
accept any stable status. Similarly, Gächter and Schulz (2016) use cross-societal
experimental data to demonstrate that intrinsic honesty is stronger in countries
where rule violations is less prevalent. Roth and Wohlfart (2018) find in admin-
istrative data that those who have experienced a high level of inequality in their
lifetime hold different fairness views and are thus less in favor of income redis-
tribution. Their finding suggests that people adapt their fairness views to what
they experience and observe over time. Herz and Taubinsky (2017) confirms
the role of previous transactions as reference points in an experiment. In their
study, subjects were first exposed to market games with different market struc-
tures, and are therefore used to high or low prices. They find that experiences
in the market games change subjects’ perceptions of what is the fair price in the
2This task is “counting zeroes”, a variation of the counting task in Abeler et al. (2011).
3I do not use monetary punishment because deducting payoffs from decision makers may be
driven by preferences for redistribution. For example, since the expected payoffs of those who choose
the (7,2) scheme is higher than those who choose the (5,5) scheme, one may argue that evaluators
use the monetary punishment to equalize the decision makers’ expected payoffs, which could be
irrelevant to moral judgments about the decision maker.
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subsequent ultimatum games. They attribute their finding to a contrast effect.
These studies provide evidence for the relativity of fairness judgments, but they
do not agree on the underlying mechanisms. I contribute to this strand of lit-
erature by examining both the contrast effect suggested by Herz and Taubinsky
(2017) and the norm-shifting effect suggested by Kahneman et al. (1986) in the
same setting. I show that the relativity of moral judgments, i.e., its dependence
on a reference point, can be explained by a contrast effect. I do not find evidence
for the norm-shifting effect at least in the setting with minimal observational
experience.
This study also speaks to the growing literature on the determinants of moral
decisions (Abeler et al., 2019; Benabou and Tirole, 2006; Bénabou et al., 2018;
Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2008; Gneezy et al., 2018; Grossman and Van Der Weele,
2017; Khalmetski and Sliwka, 2019) especially in a social context. Economists
increasingly recognize the concern for image as one of the driving factors of
moral decisions. Image is essential observers’ moral judgments about the de-
cision maker. The current study shows that a single reference choice suffices
to have a sizable impact on one’s moral image and thus has spillover effects on
other decision makers’ judgments and behaviors. Thus, seemingly independent
individual decision making may actually be interdependent. This finding pro-
vides a simple alternative explanation to the frequent observation that people
tend to behave more immorally in groups than in isolation. Immoral behavior
can be contagious due to a contrast effect when there is no diffusion of responsi-
bility (Darley and Latané, 1968; Mynatt and Sherman, 1975; Mathes and Kahn,
1975) or “replacement excuses” (Bartling et al., 2014; Falk and Szech, 2013).
The next section lays out a conceptual framework to formulate the hypothe-
ses. I describe the experimental design in section 3, present the results in Section
4, and conclude in Section 5.
3.2 Conceptual framework and Hypotheses
In this section, I present a conceptual framework to illustrate how a reference
action affects moral judgments through a contrast effect and a norm-shifting
effect.
Consider a decision environment with A = {0, 1} the set of actions available
to decision makers. An evaluator uses a function „ to judge whether a decision
maker j who chooses action aj is good or bad, after she observes a profile of
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actions denoted as (aj , a≠j).
„(aj) = „(v(aj |a≠j , A), u(aj |a≠j , A)) (3.1)
The evaluation function takes a single value which can be normalized to
[≠1, 1]. The first component of this function v captures people’s instinctive, auto-
matic and hard-wired moral sense. The second component u incorporates learn-
ing from and conforming to social norms.4
The distinct feature of this framework is that the evaluation of decision maker
j is conditional on a profile of actions (aj , a≠j) the evaluator observes. Consider
the simplest case in which the evaluator observes the actions of two decision
makers and judges decision maker j. Her judgment about decision maker j de-
pends not only on j’s action aj , but also on the other decision maker’s choice a≠j
which is later referred to as the reference action.
Suppose that the presence of the reference action a≠j affects v(.) through a
contrast effect and/or u(.) through a norm-shifting effect. Notice that both v(.)
andu(.) use the choice set A as an input, as the morality of an action depends on
available alternatives. Since I do not explore how alternatives affect moral judg-
ments, the choice set remains constant and known to all in this study. Therefore,
A will be omitted from the evaluation function in what follows.
Contrast effect The contrast effect is ubiquitous in cognition, perception, and
judgments.5 It describes the phenomenon that the perception of a stimulus is en-
hanced or diminished by another stimulus of less or greater value. The contrast
effect often results in perceptions that go against reasoning. For example, the
famous Ebbinghaus’ Tichtener Circles, as in Appendix B, uses the contrast effect
to create two identical circles that look drastically different: one of the circles is
surrounded by smaller circles and the other one is contrasted by bigger circles.
The contrast effect may work in the domain of moral judgments in a similar
way. Given a choice set A = {0, 1}, people rank the actions in terms of morality
based on their internal moral sense. Suppose a = 1 is the moral choice and
a = 0 is the immoral choice. People always judge the moral choice to be better
than the immoral one, regardless of the reference choice: v(aj = 1|aj) > v(aj =
0|aÕ
j
). This unconditional ranking can be thought of as absolute moral judgments.
4There is no consensus over the origins of morality or the hard-wired/learned dichotomy. Here I
follow Haidt (2012) and assume that morality is a combination of innateness and social learning.
5See Conway Dato-on and Dahlstrom (2003); Hartzmark and Shue (2018); Kahneman et al.
(1986); Kenrick and Gutierres (1980); Simonsohn (2006); Simonsohn and Loewenstein (2006); Pepi-
tone and DiNubile (1976).
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With different reference actions, the perception of an action being moral would
be enhanced if the reference action is of less value, i.e. immoral. Likewise, an
immoral action appears even more immoral if contrasted by a moral reference
action. More formally, the contrast effect implies that
v(aj = 1|a≠j = 0) > v(aj = 1|a≠j = 1) (3.2)
v(aj = 0|a≠j = 0) > v(aj = 0|a≠j = 1) (3.3)
Norm-shifting effect Bandura and Walters (1977) proposes that among the
many social factors that determine moral judgments, there are the base rate of
occurrence and the degree of norm variation, which are often phrased as the two
dimensions of social norms in economic literature. One dimension, corresponding
to the base rate of occurrence, is the descriptive norm, i.e. how much a behavior
is exhibited. The other dimension is the injunctive norm, i.e. how much a society
approves of a behavior. Ever since the first experiments conducted by Sherif
(1937) and Asch (1955), a large literature has shown that people tend to conform
to social norms.6 As people’s perception of social norms changes with what they
observe, their evaluation of a behavior may change in accordance with how social
norms judge that behavior.
Note that in a very specific and non-recurring environment, people often do
not know exactly the descriptive norm or the injunctive norm. In what follows,
when I refer to social norms, I mean perceived social norms, or people’s beliefs
about social norms. Define the descriptive norm as the proportion of decision
makers who choose an action a, a œ A, denoted as ◊(a) œ [0, 1]. In a decision
environment with only two possible actions, ◊(a = 0) + ◊(a = 1) = 1. Denote N(a)
as the injunctive norms over the action a, i.e. how much a society approves of
this behavior. N(a = 1) and N(a = 0) may or may not be negatively correlated:
a society can approve one action while disapproving the other, or approve or
disapprove both actions. The second component of the evaluation function u(.)
can be written as
u(aj |◊(aj |a≠j), N(aj |a≠j)), (3.4)
6For more literature on conformity, see for example Allcott (2011); Allen and Wilder (1977); Bic-
chieri (2016); Bicchieri et al. (2020); Cialdini et al. (1990); Cialdini and Goldstein (2004); Gerber and
Rogers (2009); Keizer et al. (2008); Nolan et al. (2008); Prentice and Miller (1993); Schultz et al.
(2007).
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where u is increasing in both ◊(aj) and N(aj).
The connection between the reference action and the beliefs about the descrip-
tive norm is obvious. Rational evaluators would adapt their beliefs about the de-
scriptive norm to the frequency of a certain behavior they actually observe. Fix-
ing the prior and aj , we immediately have: ◊(aj = 1|a≠j = 1) > ◊(aj = 1|a≠j = 0),
and ◊(aj = 0|a≠j = 1) < ◊(aj = 0|a≠j = 0).
Even though descriptive norm and injunctive norm are logically distinct con-
cepts and they do not necessarily align, literature suggests that people some-
times infer injunctive norm from descriptive norm and vice versa (Eriksson et al.,
2015; Hoeft and Mill, 2017; Kelley, 1971; Lindström et al., 2018; McGraw, 1985;
Trafimow et al., 2001; Welch et al., 2005). If evaluators associate what is com-
mon with what is socially appropriate–a “common is moral” phenomenon, they
may also update their beliefs about injunctive norms upon observing a profile of
actions. Thus, fixing the decision maker’s action aj we have: Np(aj = 1|a≠j =
1) > Np(aj = 1|a≠j = 0), and Np(aj = 0|a≠j = 1) < Np(aj = 0|a≠j = 0), where
the superscript p means “posterior”.
Evaluators judge an action to be more moral, if more people are doing it, or if
the action is more socially appropriate. The norm-shifting effect gives
u(aj = 1|a≠j = 0) < u(aj = 1|a≠j = 1) (3.5)
u(aj = 0|a≠j = 0) > u(aj = 0|a≠j = 1) (3.6)
By combining the contrast effect and the norm-shifting effect, it follows that
a reference action has asymmetric effects on judgments for moral and immoral
actions. When people judge immoral decision makers, the contrast effect and the
norm-shifting effect go hand in hand. Equations (3.3) and (3.6) yield the first
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3.1 (IM). An immoral decision maker is judged to be nicer if the
reference action is immoral than if the reference action is moral:
„(aj = 0|a≠j = 0) > „(aj = 0|a≠j = 1)
However, when it comes to moral decision makers, equations (3.2) and (3.5)
show that the norm-shifting effect and the contrast effect work in opposite direc-
tions. It is not clear which effect will dominate the other. Therefore, I hypothesize
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Hypothesis 3.2 (M). Judgments about a moral decision maker does not change
whether the reference action is immoral or moral:
„(aj = 1|a≠j = 0) = „(aj = 1|a≠j = 1)
I will test these hypotheses in section 4.2 and explore the contrast effect and
the norm-shifting effect in 4.3.
3.3 The Experiment
3.3.1 Experimental Design
In the experiment, subjects are assigned the role of either a decision maker or
an evaluator. The decision makers make their choices in a binary dictator game.
The evaluators are fully informed of the rules of the binary dictator game. After
observing the choices of two decision makers in the game, they make judgments
about one of the decision makers.
The binary dictator game offers two payoff schemes: a scheme that gives five
euros to both the decision maker and her paired participant, and a scheme that
gives seven euros to the decision maker and two euros to her paired participant.
Decision makers simultaneously choose one of the two payoff schemes. One of the
paired decision makers will be randomly selected and her choice will determine
their payoffs. In the subsequent sections, I refer to the payoff scheme (5,5) as the
“moral choice” and the payoff scheme (7,2) as the “immoral choice”.
After all decision makers have chosen between the two schemes, each evalu-
ator observes the choices of two random decision makers who are not necessarily
paired without knowing the realized payoff scheme or their final payments. The
evaluator is then asked to judge only one of the two decision makers. The other
decision maker’s choice is regarded as the reference action. The combination
of the choice of the decision maker to be judged and the reference choice as-
signs evaluators to four conditions: observe two moral choices and judge one of
them (T11), observe two different choices and judge the moral one (T10), observe
two different choices and judge the immoral one (T01), or observe two immoral
choices and judge one of them (T00).
To elicit the moral judgment of the evaluator, I employ both an explicit mea-
sure and a behavioral measure. The explicit measure includes a series of ques-
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tions regarding the decision makers’ eight personality traits on a 7-point Likert
scale. These personality traits are: risk-aversiveness, selfishness, trustworthi-
ness, patience, intelligence, honesty, kindness and temperament. Among these
traits only selfishness is both morality-related and directly related to decision
makers’ choice in the binary dictator game. Three personality traits (trustworthi-
ness, kindness, honesty) are related to moral judgments but not directly related
to the binary dictator game. Risk preference, patience, intelligence, and temper-
ament are neither related to moral judgments nor the binary dictator game.7 An
attention check question is inserted among these questions regarding the per-
sonality traits.
The behavioral measure rests on the presumption that an evaluator’s willing-
ness to punish/reward a decision maker reflects her moral judgments about the
decision maker (McGraw, 1985). Evaluators are asked to allocate a number of
real-effort tasks to the decision maker being judged immediately after observing
the two choices. The real-effort task is to count the number of “1”s in a sequence
such as “1010000101111010111101”. The evaluator decides how many sequences
(minimal 1 and maximal 20) the decision maker needs to solve before she/he gets
paid. This task requires no specific skill and it is boring, so it can be seen as
some sort of punishment. I use the number of sequences the evaluator assigns to
a decision maker as the implicit behavioral measure of moral judgments.
To control for the perceived descriptive norm, evaluators are required to pro-
vide their estimate on the proportion of decision makers in previous sessions
making the moral choice. Evaluators earn a bonus if their estimates deviate
from the true proportion by no more than 5 percentage point. As to the perceived
injunctive norm, I apply the elicitation method of Krupka and Weber (2013).
Evaluators rate the social appropriateness for choosing each payoff scheme on a
7 point Likert scale. They will earn a bonus if their rating turns out to be the
modal rating of all evaluators. Their own ratings are therefore treated as the
perceived injunctive norm over the possible actions.
As an attention check, I inserted an irrelevant question in the elicitation of ex-
plicit moral judgments and specified the correct answer evaluators should choose
7The selection of personality traits except selfishness is to some extent arbitrary. I include them
mainly for two reasons. First, I use them as a sanity check. For traits that are not related to morality
or the dictator game, I expected the evaluators to rate decision makers similarly along these traits
regardless of the decision makers’ choices. For traits that are not related to the dictator game but
somewhat related to morality, the evaluators may or may not rate the decision makers differently
depending on their choices in the dictator game. I expect the biggest difference in the ratings of
selfishness. Second, I hide the outcome variable of interest, i.e., morality-related traits, among the
unrelated traits to reduce the experimenter demanding effect.
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in the question. Those who did not choose the specified answer failed the atten-
tion check.
3.3.2 Procedures
The experiment was conducted at CentERlab of Tilburg University.8 Partici-
pants registered in the first session of the experiment were assigned the role of
decision maker, which was framed as “Green player” in the experiment.9 Upon
registration, decision makers were informed that the experiment consists of two
parts which will take place on the day they showed up and a week later respec-
tively. They would only be paid if they participate in both parts. Participants
registered in all the other sessions were assigned the role of evaluator, which
was framed as “Red player”. Evaluators only visited the lab once. In total, 206
subjects from Tilburg University participated in the experiment, of whom 167
were assigned the role of an evaluator. Evaluators received 6.2 euros on average
for half an hour in the lab. Decision makers spent less than half an hour in total
in the lab and earned 9.4 euros on average.
Figure 3.1: Experiment Procedure
Figure 3.1 summarizes the procedure of the experiment. Subjects who were
assigned the role of decision maker received instructions on the moral task, the
real-effort task, and the schedule upon arrival. In the instructions, it is made
clear to the decision makers that their choices in the moral task will be revealed
8I pre-registered the experimental design on AsPredicted. For more details of the pre-
registration, see: https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=q4ti3j.
9Data collection of the experiment is split into two waves that took place in June and September
respectively because recruitment in June was not satisfying due to a clash with the exam week.
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to some evaluators in future sessions in an anonymous way and that the number
of real-effort tasks they receive will be dictated by those evaluators. Decision
makers were instructed to come back to the lab on the last day of the experiment
to finish the real-effort tasks assigned to them before collecting their payments.
Decision makers’ beliefs about the descriptive norm and the injunctive norm in
the moral task were elicited after having made their choices.
Evaluators first read the instructions that decision makers received. This
makes sure that evaluators were fully aware of the decision environment the de-
cision makers were confronted with. Next, evaluators learned about their tasks
in the experiment, including the belief elicitation and the real-effort task alloca-
tion. Given all this information, evaluators’ beliefs about the descriptive norm
and the injunctive norm in the moral task were elicited. Then each evaluator was
presented with the choices of two random decision makers in the moral task and
was told to which of the two decision makers they were going to assign real-effort
task. After they decided on the number of sequences, they reported perceived so-
cial norms again. In the final step, they were asked to judge the decision maker
along the eight personality traits.
3.4 Results
I exclude the inputs of 14 evaluators who failed the attention check. 10 The rest
of the evaluators fall randomly into 4 groups, depending on the action of decision
maker and the reference action. I use Taia≠i to identify each group, with ai being
the action of the decision maker and a≠i being the reference action. There are 36
evaluators in T11, 42 in T10, 36 in T01, and 39 in T00.
I will first validate the “moral task” by showing evaluators’ absolute judg-
ments about the two choices and the decision makers who choose them. Then I
move on to testing the hypotheses. Finally, I discuss the contrast effect and the
norm-shifting effect in more details.
3.4.1 Absolute moral judgments about decision makers
Do evaluators consider choosing the (5,5) payoff scheme a moral choice and the
(7,2) payoff scheme an immoral choice? This section answers the question by
10The percentage of subjects who failed the attention check is a bit high, most likely because
the attention check appears among the questions about decision makers’ personality traits. These
questions are not incentivized, which may attract less attention than incentivized questions. Also,
there are eight of them, all looking very similar, which may partly explain subjects’ inattention.
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comparing the ex ante perceived injunctive norm over the two available choices
and the absolute judgments about moral and immoral decision makers.
The top panel and the bottom panel of Figure 3.2 present the distribution of
social appropriateness ratings on choosing the two payoff schemes before sub-
jects observe real choices. The perceived social approval of the two choices differ
starkly: 96.1% of the subjects people believe choosing the (5,5) scheme to be so-
cially appropriate (“a bit/somewhat/very socially appropriate”), while 86.3% of
the subjects believe choosing the (7,2) scheme to be socially inappropriate (“a
bit/somewhat/very socially inappropriate”). Subjects generally agree on the so-
cial appropriateness ratings, but there is greater consensus when it comes to
choosing the (5,5) scheme than choosing the (7,2) scheme. 64.7% of the evalua-
tors agree on the (5,5) scheme being “very socially appropriate” while only 44.7%
of the evaluators agree on the (7,2) scheme to be “somewhat socially inappropri-
ate”, which is the modal response.11
Figure 3.2: Distribution of social appropriateness ratings on choosing the (5,5)
payoff scheme and on choosing the (7,2) payoff scheme.
The evaluators judge the decision maker along eight personality traits: risk-
attitude, selfishness, trustworthiness, patience, intelligence, honesty, kindness
and temperament. Figure 3.3 presents the evaluators’ average ratings on these
personality traits of the decision makers conditional on their choices. Decision
11Note that people’s belief of how the society approves of a behavior does not always coincide with
how much she/he approves of that behavior (for example, see Bursztyn et al. (2018)).
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Figure 3.3: Explicit judgments about moral and immoral decision makers, aggre-
gated over the reference actions.
makers who choose the moral option are judged to be less selfish, more trust-
worthy, more honest, and more kind than those who make the immoral choice.
A bit surprisingly, the evaluators also believe that the moral task is informative
of the decision makers’ risk attitudes, patience, and temperament. They rate
moral decision makers as more risk averse, more patient, and more emotional
than immoral decision makers. These differences are all significant at 1% level
by Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test. Only intelligence is thought to be unrelated to
the moral task.
The explicit measure of moral judgments about the decision makers is re-
flected in the behavioral measure of moral judgments as well. Figure 3.4 shows
the distribution of the number of real-effort tasks assigned to moral decision
makers and immoral ones. 24.4% of the moral decision makers are assigned only
1 task, which is the minimum amount. In sharp contrast, 24% of the immoral
decision makers receive the maximal amount of real-effort task. In other words,
they are punished to the upper limit. Moral decision makers receive 7.53 tasks
on average, significantly less than 13.3, the average number of tasks immoral de-
cision makers receive (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, n1 = 78, n2 = 75, p < 0.01).
In sum, both the explicit measure and the behavioral measure of moral judg-
ments suggest that evaluators judge decision makers distinctively depending on
their choices.
62
Figure 3.4: Behavioral measure of moral judgments about moral and immoral
decision makers, aggregated over the reference actions.
3.4.2 Main results: the effect of reference action on moral
judgments
Recall that the reference action is hypothesized to have asymmetric effect on
judgments for moral decision makers and immoral decision makers. Specifi-
cally, immoral decision makers seem worse when contrasted by a moral refer-
ence choice than by an immoral reference action. But it is not so clear in which
directions a reference action affects judgments about moral decision makers.
Explicit moral judgments The evaluators judge decision makers along eight
personality traits. However, there is no global consensus on which of these traits
are in the moral domain. So I construct three different measures of explicit
moral judgments that vary in broadness. First, in the narrowest term, the choice
between the (5,5) payoff scheme and the (7,2) payoff scheme in the setting is a
direct signal of the decision maker’s selfishness. Hence, the rating on selfishness
is the narrowest measure of explicit moral judgments. The second measure is a
composite morality score that takes the average of ratings on morally relevant
personality traits, i.e. selfishness, trustworthiness, kindness, and honesty. Fi-
nally, I construct a composite image score by averaging the ratings on all the
personality traits that subjects believe to be correlated with the decision makers’
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choices. For example, if the evaluators think those who choose the moral option
are more risk averse than those who choose the immoral option, then the rating
on risk attitude is taken into account in the composite image score. As shown
in figure 3.3, the evaluators judge moral decision makers and immoral decision
makers distinctively along all personality traits except intelligence. Therefore,
the rating on intelligence is excluded from the composite image score and the
other seven personality traits are counted in.
Explicit moral judgments do not respond to the reference action, whether
measured by selfishness, composite morality score, or composite image score.
As an example, Figure 3.5 presents the average composite image score across
treatments. Moral decision makers score significantly higher (Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney test, n1 = 78, n2 = 75, p < 0.01) than immoral decision makers. How-
ever, given the decision maker’s choice, the composite image score does not vary
with the reference choice. Regressions of the three different variables on the
reference choice confirm that explicit moral judgments are independent of the
reference choice. The regression results are reported in Table 2 and Table 3 in
Appendix C.
Figure 3.5: Explicit judgments about decision makers sorted by the decision
maker’s choice and the reference choice.
Behavioral measure of moral judgments Figure 3.6 presents the average
number of real-effort task allocated to the decision makers, sorted by the decision
64
maker’s choice and the reference choice. Immoral decision makers receive 15.2
real-effort tasks on average when the reference choice is moral but only receive
11.7 real-effort tasks when the reference choice is immoral. The difference is
statistically significant (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, n1 = 36, n2 = 39, p =
0.04). That is, evaluators punish immoral decision makers more harshly when
they see a moral reference choice than when they observe an immoral reference
choice. Meanwhile, the number of tasks assigned to moral decision makers does
not change with the reference choice (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, n1 = 36,
n2 = 42, p = 0.6).
The results are summarized below.
Figure 3.6: Number of real-effort task allocated to decision makers sorted by the
decision maker’s choice and the reference choice.
Result 3.1. Immoral decision makers are punished more harshly if the reference
choice is moral than if it is immoral. However, explicit moral judgments about
immoral decision makers are not affected by the reference point.
Result 3.2. The reference choice affects neither the number of real-effort tasks
assigned to the moral decision makers nor the explicit judgments about moral
decision makers.
The the relationship between the behavioral measure of moral judgments and
the reference choice demonstrates the exact pattern as hypothesized. These re-
sults together lend support to both Hypothesis IM and Hypothesis M.
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3.4.3 The contrast effect and the norm-shifting effect
In previous section, I find that the behavioral measure of moral judgments reacts
to a reference choice in the same way as predicted. In this section, I decompose
the overall effect of a reference action on moral judgments into a contrast effect
and a norm-shifting effect to see if these two effects are indeed the underlying
mechanisms of the previous findings.
The contrast effect The data is split into a sub-sample for moral decision
makers and a sub-sample for immoral decision makers. To separate the contrast
effect from the norm-shifting effect, I run reduced form individual-level regres-
sions of moral judgments on the reference choice and ex post perceived social
norms for the moral decision maker sub-sample and for the immoral decision
maker sub-sample. The estimated regression is:




where „ is the number of real-effort tasks evaluator i assigns to decision maker
j.12 Ri is the reference choice evaluator i observes next to the choice of the de-
cision maker j she judges. ◊p
i
is evaluator i’s ex post belief about the descriptive
norm, i.e. the proportion of decision makers choosing action aj , and Npi is her ex
post belief about the injunctive norm over the decision maker’s action aj .
The dependent variable „–the number of real-effort tasks–takes a greater
value if decision maker j is judged to be worse. Therefore, a negative “ or ÷ indi-
cates that moral judgments about a decision maker increases with the perceived
descriptive norm or the perceived injunctive norm. When perceive social norms
are controlled for, — captures the contrast effect.
The first column of Table 4.1 shows the results from a censored tobit regres-
sion for the moral sub-sample. Moral decision makers receive less real-effort
tasks if evaluators consider the action as more socially appropriate. However,
the reference action has no effect on the amount of real-effort tasks moral deci-
sion makers receive, which suggests that the contrast effect does not play a role
in this case. Column 2 of Table 4.1 presents the regression results for the im-
12I focus on the behavioral measure in this section because it has been shown to respond to a
reference action while the explicit measure of moral judgments does not. It makes more sense to
explore the mechanisms of an impact when there is an impact. Nonetheless, I run regression results
of the explicit measures of moral judgments and report the results in Appendix C. No significant
coefficient is found.
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moral sub-sample. As the contrast effect predicts, an immoral reference choice
decreases the number of real-effort tasks immoral decision makers receive by
4.85.
Result 3.3. A contrast effect is found only when evaluators are judging immoral
decision makers.
Table 3.1: Determinants of the behavioral measure of moral judgments
Dependent variable: NO. tasks
Moral DMs Immoral DMs
Immoral reference action ≠0.078 ≠4.851úú
(1.907) (2.012)
Descriptive norm ≠3.583 3.615
(4.054) (3.979)







Akaike Inf. Crit. 434.739 418.716
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 446.522 430.304
Note: úp<0.1; úúp<0.05; úúúp<0.01
In neither sub-sample does the descriptive norm influence the number of real-
effort tasks assigned to the decision makers. The perceived injunctive norm over
the moral action affects the punishment moral decision makers receive: the more
socially appropriate the evaluator beliefs the action to be, the less real-effort
tasks she assigns to the decision maker. But the injunctive norm over the im-
moral action does not affect punishment on immoral decision makers.
Result 3.4. Perceived descriptive norm is not a significant factor in determining
moral judgments.
Result 3.5. Perceived injunctive norm is positively correlated with judgments
about moral decision makers but not about immoral decision makers.
Recall that Result 3.1 states that immoral decision makers are punished more
harshly when they are compared with a moral decision maker than when they
are compared with an immoral decision maker. Result 3.2 states that judgments
about moral decision makers are not affected by a reference choice. Result 3.3-
3.5 suggest that the contrast effect seems to be the underlying mechanism for
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Result 1 and that the norm-shifting effect may be relevant to Result 3.2, which I
will examine next.
Shifting the descriptive norm Result 3.4 finds that the descriptive norm
is not a significant determinant of moral judgments. On the other hand, the in-
junctive norm is a major determinant of judgments about moral decision makers,
according to Result 3.5. The unanswered question is whether and how individu-
als update their beliefs about the descriptive norms upon observing two random
actions.
The actual percentage of moral choices in the experiment is 46%. Figure 9 in
Appendix C presents the distribution of the ex ante perceived descriptive norm
of the evaluators. Most evaluators are wrong about the descriptive norm; the
majority of them are not even close. The distribution of guesses shows that there
is no consensus over the descriptive norm.
Evaluators may update their beliefs about the descriptive norm based on the
actual choices they observe. To describe the updating process more formally,
denote an evaluator i’s ex ante belief about the proportion of moral choices as
◊a
i
and her ex post belief about the proportion of moral choices as ◊p
i
. In the
experiment, evaluator i observes the choices of two decision makers aj and a≠j .
The observed descriptive norm is denoted as ◊̂i = aj+a≠j2 . If the observed norm ◊̂i
is greater than she originally believes, she would update her belief upward, and
vice versa. I define an adaptive evaluator as someone who updates her belief in
the same direction as the observed descriptive norm relative to her prior belief.





) ú (◊̂i ≠ ◊ai ) Ø 0.13
Figure 3.7 demonstrates in details how each evaluator updates her belief
about the descriptive norm conditional on her prior belief and the observed de-
scriptive norm. On the x-axis lies the distance between the observed descriptive
norm and the evaluators’ ex ante belief about the descriptive norm: ◊̂i ≠ ◊ai . The





of the evaluators are qualified as adaptive evaluators, identified by dots in the
shaded area. Notice that among these adaptive evaluators, 56 of them, which is
13Those who do not update their beliefs about social norms are temporarily classified as adaptive
evaluators until proven otherwise, because they have a reason not to update: two actual choices
are not provide compelling evidence against their initial beliefs. In cases where they observe more
choices, they might update in accordance with the observed descriptive norm.
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Figure 3.7: Updates of perceived descriptive norm upon observing actual choices
36.6% of all the subjects, do not update their beliefs even when there is a discrep-
ancy between their prior beliefs and the observed descriptive norm.
At the group level, altering the reference action indeed results in different
average perceived descriptive norm, but not to a statistically significant extent.
Figure 10 in Appendix C presents more details of the average ex ante belief and ex
post belief about the descriptive norm across treatments. The ex post beliefs are
not distinguishable between T10 and T11 or between T01 and T00. This confirms
that the perceived descriptive norm does not likely account for the difference in
moral judgments between T01 and T00.
Shifting the injunctive norms If people tend to take what is normal as what
is right (Eriksson et al., 2015; Hoeft and Mill, 2017; Kelley, 1971; Lindström
et al., 2018; McGraw, 1985; Trafimow et al., 2001; Welch et al., 2005), we should
observe a strong correlation between one’s ex ante perceived descriptive norm
and ex ante perceived injunctive norm. Yet no such correlation is found in the
data, which implies that subjects see the descriptive norm and the injunctive
norm as distinct concepts and that a shift in one of them does not automatically
lead to a shift in the other.
While more than half of the evaluators update their beliefs about the descrip-
tive norm, most of them do not change their beliefs about the injunctive norms
at all. 87.3% of them stick to their ex ante belief about the injunctive norm over
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the moral choice and 82.8 % do not change their belief about the injunctive norm
over the immoral choice.
At the treatment level, varying the reference choice does not cause any no-
ticeable difference in ex post perceived injunctive norms between T11 and T10 or
between T01 and T00, as shown in Figure 11 in Appendix C.
Does the norm-shifting effect play a role? Combining the results in this
section, I find little evidence of the norm-shifting effect. First, although observing
actual choices shifts the perceived descriptive norm, the perceived descriptive
norm is not a significant determinant of moral judgments, as Table 4.1 shows.
Second, observing two choices barely affects perceived injunctive norms in
the first place, nor does it lead to any significant difference between treatments.
Thus, the norm-shifting effect cannot account for the relativity of moral judg-
ments found in this experiment.
3.5 Conclusion
In this study, I use a lab experiment to show that moral judgments about a deci-
sion maker depend on the reference choice people observe. Particularly, subjects
punish an immoral decision maker more harshly if they observe a moral refer-
ence choice than if they observe an immoral one due to a contrast effect. By elic-
iting perceived social norms, I show that moral judgments do not depend on the
perceived descriptive norm; and observing actual choices do not shift perceived
injunctive norms.
This paper shows that moral judgments are malleable and made relative to
reference choices. A single reference choice suffices to have a sizable impact on
moral judgments and thus has spillover effects on others’ judgments and hence
behaviors. This result provides a simple alternative explanation–the contrast
effect–to the frequent observation that people tend to behave more immorally
in groups than in isolation. It takes less than a replacement excuse, a narra-
tive, a competitive market or the support of social norms for people to feel more
comfortable choosing the immoral behavior. The result also highlights the possi-
bility that in a minimal social context, seemingly independent decisions can be
interdependent. In such cases, individual decision-making should be treated as
a game.
The result on the contrast effect suggests that moral judgments do not com-
pletely emerge from norm-based reasoning. Instead, moral judgments probably
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rely heavily on heuristics, which coincides with the findings of moral psychology
(Haidt, 2012). The result further implies that the effect of a reference choice on
moral judgments is likely transient. As the contrast effect is a fundamental prin-
ciple of perception, it should disappear once the reference choice is not present.
An interesting future line of research would be the direction of the contrast ef-
fect as the number of alternatives increases and the strength of the contrast
effect when there are more than two decision makers.
While the norm-shifting effect does not account for the finding of this study,
this of course does not mean that it never plays a role. As to whether observa-
tional experience can change perceived injunctive norms, literature finds mixed
evidence in lab settings (Dimant et al., 2020; Hoeft and Mill, 2017). One may rea-
sonably expect the norm-shifting effect to be powerful in some special cases. For
instance, when people enter a new cultural environment, their moral standards
may adapt quickly to observed social norms. To reconcile these findings and intu-
itions, factors that determine the tipping point at which injunctive norms evolve
remain to be investigated.
Another finding that raises further questions is the asymmetry of the rela-
tivity of moral judgments: the reference choice affects moral judgments about
immoral decision makers but not about moral decision makers. Does it manifest
the moral-immoral asymmetry or the reward-punish asymmetry? Does it have
something to do with social norms? These questions provide directions for future
research.
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Appendix A. Instructions for the evaluators
You will receive a fixed amount of 5 euros by the end of the experiment. In
addition, you might earn more depending on your responses in the experiment.
Payments will be made to you in cash at the conclusion of the experiment.
There are two roles in this experiment: “Green player” and “Red player”. You
are assigned the role of Red player.
Before continuing, please read carefully the instructions that Green players
received. Green players have to do two tasks: an allocation task and a counting
task. The tasks take place on different days. They have already done the allo-
cation task; they need to do the counting task on a day in November (known to
them). All the instructions of the Green players are in italics.
Instructions for Green players
The allocation task You and another Green player are paired. Both of you
have to choose between two allocation plans: Plan 1: You receive 5 euros; your
paired Green player receives 5 euros. Plan 2: You receive 7 euros; your paired
Green player receives 2 euros.
You and your paired Green player will make your choice simultaneously and
anonymously. After both of you have submitted the plan you prefer, one of you
will be randomly selected, and the choice of this player will be implemented. That
is, your earnings and the earnings of your paired Green player will be determined
according to the plan submitted by the selected Green player.
For example, Green player A and Green player B are paired. A chooses plan
1 and B chooses plan 2. Then the computer selects B. Therefore, B will receive 7
euros and A will receive 2 euros.
Your choice will be later shown to some Red players in other sessions. Red
players can only see your participant ID and which plan you have chosen. But
no participant will ever know your identity. You will never know the identities of
the Red players or Green players either.
The counting task You will see a sequence with “0”s and “1”s on the screen.
Your task is to count the number of “1”s in each sequence. Below you will see an
example: 0011100100010011000100101001100110000101 010000110 (answer:
19)
In the instructions of part I, you were already informed that your choice in
part I will be shown to some Red players in future sessions. One of these Red
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players will be able to decide how many sequences you will need to solve correctly
on [ ]. The number of sequences a Red player can assign is between 1 and 20.
That is, you will need to solve 1 sequence at least and 20 sequences at most.
You will receive your total payments immediately after you have solved all of
the sequences correctly. For each sequence, you have multiple chances to correct
your answer.
You have finished reading the instructions of the two tasks that Green players
received. Now we continue with instructions for you as a Red player.
Instructions, Part I
You will be asked a few questions regarding the allocation task that Green play-
ers already did in previous sessions. Please answer the questions as truthfully
as you can. These questions give you a chance to earn more money. Your answers
in the experiment remain anonymous.
Q1: Please think of the choices of Green players of previous sessions. What is
the percentage of Green players who have chosen plan 1? If your guess is close
enough (± 5
Q2 and Q3 ask you to evaluate the social appropriateness of choosing each
plan.
By “socially appropriate”, we mean behavior that most people agree is the
“correct” or “ethical” thing to do. You can choose from 7 categories: “very socially
inappropriate”, “somewhat socially inappropriate”, “a bit socially inappropriate”,
“neutral”, “a bit socially appropriate”, “somewhat socially appropriate”, and “very
socially appropriate”.
At the conclusion of the experiment, the computer will check for each question
which category has been chosen by most participants. All participants who have
chosen this category will earn 1 euro per question. For example, there are 10
participants. 8 of them choose “very socially inappropriate”. The other 2 choose
“very socially appropriate”. Then each of the 8 participants who choose “very
socially inappropriate” will earn 1 euro.
Q2: Please consider plan 1: You receive 5 euros; your paired Green player
receives 5 euros. How socially appropriate do you think it is to choose plan 1 in
the allocation task? If your answer corresponds to the category chosen by most
participants you will earn 1 euro.
Q3: Please consider plan 2: You receive 7 euros; your paired Green player
receives 2 euros. How socially appropriate do you think it is to choose plan 2 in
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the allocation task? If your answer corresponds to the category chosen by most
participants you will earn 1 euro.
Instructions, Part II
The participant IDs and the actual choices in the allocation task of two random
Green players will be shown to you. You will be matched with one of them.
Your task is to decide how many sequences (as described in the instructions of
the counting task) your matched Green player will need to solve correctly before
she/he can collect her/his final payoffs. The number of sequences has to be be-
tween 1 and 20. If multiple Red players are matched with the same Green player,
it will be randomly decided which Red player’s decision will be implemented for
this Green player.
Appendix B. Illustration of the contrast effect
Figure 8: The contrast effect
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Appendix C. More results
The impact of a reference action on the explicit judgments
about the decision maker
Table 2 and 3present the results of the following estimated regression for the
moral decision maker sub-sample and for the immoral decision maker sub-sample
respectively:
„i = —Ri + ‘i (8)
where „ is the explicit moral judgment. I use three different dependent variables:
selfishness, composite morality score and composite image score to measure „.
Ri is the reference choice evaluator i observes next to the choice of the decision
maker j. The reference point has no effect on explicit moral judgments for either
sub-sample.
Distribution of the ex ante perceived descriptive norm
Figure 9 shows the distribution of the perceived descriptive norm, the percentage
of moral choices specifically, before the evaluators observe any actual choice. The


















































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 9: Distribution of the ex ante perceived descriptive norm
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The ex ante and ex post perceived descriptive norm
Figure 9 shows the average ex ante and ex post perceived descriptive norm across
treatments. Before the evaluators observe actual choices, all treatments share a
similar perceived descriptive norm on average. After the evaluators observe two
actual choices, they update their beliefs about the descriptive norm in the direc-
tion aligned with Bayesian updating. The differences in perceived descriptive
norm between T11 and T10 and between T01 and T11 are of interest, yet neither
of them is statistically significant.
Figure 10: The ex ante and ex post perceived descriptive norm across treatments
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The ex ante and ex post perceived injunctive norm
Figure 9 shows the average ex ante and ex post perceived injunctive norms over
the two choices across treatments. Perceived injunctive norms are similar across
treatments with one exception: the left panel shows that T11 perceives the moral
choice as more socially appropriate than T10 due to imperfect randomization.
Figure 11: ex ante and ex post perceived injunctive norms across treatments
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Chapter 4
The persistent impact of
information slant
4.1 Introduction
Between 2013 and 2015 a British high-tech company had released about 450,000
male genetically modified (GMO) mosquitoes every week in Brazil, in an effort to
eliminate a disease-carrying species of mosquitoes. These GMO mosquitoes are
expected to pass on the modified genes that prevent their offspring from reaching
the adult stage and reproducing. One article on the result of the practice says:
The practice was a huge success. The release of GMO mosquitoes
worked tremendously well by reducing local mosquito populations by
90% during the trial.
Another article reports:
The release of GMO mosquitoes seemed to work.The local mosquito
population was reduced substantially, yet, almost 10% of them re-
mained active.
Information slant as the above examples conveys a particular viewpoint or
inclination by choice of words, tone, and framing without necessarily misrepre-
senting the underlying facts. Sometimes people are still persuaded by informa-
This chapter is based on a joint project with Sili Zhang.
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tion slant despite being aware that it is partial and intended to manipulate their
thinking,1 which may lead to biased or even polarized beliefs.
While it is worrisome that people are conscious and yet susceptible to infor-
mation slant, it is not clear whether and how people can counteract its impact.
In this paper, we examine whether and to what extent a procedure, which gives
people an opportunity to acquire more information from both sides, mitigates
the impact of information slant. We expect an effect of this procedure because
information from the other side increases the awareness and understanding of
rationales for the viewpoint of the other side (Mutz, 2002). Moreover, subse-
quent information may dilute the impact of initial information slant. Intuitively,
as people acquire more common information, they may be able to find more com-
mon ground on the issue and opinions and attitudes should move toward each
other.
In a controlled experiment, we choose a concrete issue, the use of GMO mosquitoes
in disease control, and construct two versions of initial information. The initial
information is based on the same set of underlying facts but slanted toward ei-
ther the pro-GMO side or anti-GMO side, as previous examples have shown. A
key feature of the design is that subjects are well informed that the information
they receive is slanted toward one side of the issue and toward which side ex-
actly. We elicit subjects’ attitudes toward the use of GMO mosquitoes after their
exposure to the initial information. Attitudes are measured by a self-reported
view on the GMO mosquitoes and how people allocate a donation between two
organizations that favor GMO mosquitoes or against GMO mosquitoes. Next,
we offer subjects an opportunity to acquire more information from both sides
and elicit their attitudes for a second time to see whether and in what direction
their attitudes change. Additionally, we add a treatment in which subjects are
required to read all the subsequent information as a baseline for comparison.
This treatment allows us to assess the pure effects of subsequent information on
attitudes.
We learn from existing studies that several mechanisms may limit people’s
capacity to counteract information slant. A first mechanism is that people ne-
glect the fact that the information they receive is one-sided or they are unaware
of the potential effect such information may have on them. Enke (2020) finds
1A large literature has established that people are sometimes persuaded by information that
may be slanted or distorted, for example, political information delivered by partisan-affiliated agents
(e.g., DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007)), professional recommendations given by people at stake (e.g.,
Koehler and Mercer (2009)), or legal arguments written in a deliberately biased way to represent the
interests of a specific party (e.g., Brenner et al. (1996)).
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that many people do not take into account the unobserved information because
it never comes to their mind.2 A second mechanism is motivated reasoning: peo-
ple are motivated to favor certain information rather than to counteract it.3 A
third mechanism is that people who already adopt certain positions may suffer
from confirmation bias.4 In particular, they tend to overestimate the strength of
information that is aligned with their prior views, and thus are more susceptible
to such information.
We help people reach their full capacity of counteracting the impact of infor-
mation slant by minimizing the influence of the above mentioned mechanisms.
To encourage subjects to reflect on and counteract information slant, we first
make it clear to them that the information they receive is one-sided and that they
are randomly assigned to this side. Furthermore, we ask subjects to estimate the
attitudes of those who have seen information from both sides in a incentivized
manner. To minimize motivated reasoning and confirmation bias, we target at
people who are unfamiliar with and have no prior beliefs about GMO mosquitoes.
Our results show that information slant indeed affects subjects’ attitudes:
at the aggregate level, subjects’ self-reported attitudes toward the use of GMO
mosquitoes lean in the direction aligned with the initial slant compared to the
attitudes of those who have seen both sides; and subjects allocate a larger frac-
tion of donation to the organization favoring the side aligned with the initial
information than those who have seen both sides. The opportunity to acquire
information from both sides only slightly mitigates the impact of information
slant, as there is mild evidence that attitudes move closer after information ac-
quisition, whereas exogenously imposed information does not narrow the gap
between subjects exposed to different sides. We find that the impact of initial
information slant may be persistent: it shifts subjects’ attitudes, and the shift
in attitudes in turn induces confirmation bias which distorts the way people pro-
cess subsequent information. The induced confirmation bias partly accounts for
people’s failure of fully counteracting the impact of initial information slant.
A vast literature has established that slanted information affects people’s at-
2Note that our aim is to study how people deal with information slant embedded in natural
language. In an abstract setting as Enke’s, information in the form of math language, i.e., numbers,
does not leave much room for slant.
3Literature shows that people seek, avoid, or misinterpret information in service of self-interest.
See, e.g., Bénabou and Tirole (2002); Dana et al. (2007); Ditto and Lopez (1992); Epley and Gilovich
(2016); Exley (2016); Grossman and Van Der Weele (2017); Kunda (1990); Taber and Lodge (2006).
4A vast psychological literature provides evidence of confirmation bias. See, e.g., Darley and
Gross (1983); Klayman and Ha (1987); Lord et al. (1979); Nickerson (1998); Plous (1991). For eco-
nomic research on confirmation bias, see e.g.,Rabin and Schrag (1999); Fryer Jr et al. (2019); Golman
et al. (2016).
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titudes and behaviors; for example, see Chiang and Knight (2011); DellaVigna
and Kaplan (2007); DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2010); Gentzkow and Shapiro
(2006); Grigorieff et al. (2020); Lippmann (1946); Martin and Yurukoglu (2017).
However, direct evidence on the persuasion effects of information slant when peo-
ple are aware thereof is scarce. The closest study to our paper is Brenner et al.
(1996). They use a hypothetically legal dispute to show that one-sided evidence
leads to biased predictions and judgments even when people know full well that
the information available to them represents only one side of the dispute. They
find that asking subjects to contemplate the relative strength of the two sides
greatly reduces the bias induced by one-sided evidence.
Our study also adds to the growing literature on the demand for information
about multi-side issues. Most studies investigate the demand for information in
a naturally occurring environment, for example, news consumption. These stud-
ies offer a mixed and nuanced view of how people select information sources; see
Bakshy et al. (2015); Flaxman et al. (2016); Halberstam and Knight (2016); Gar-
rett (2009); Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006); Iyengar and Hahn (2009). The overall
take-away message is that, despite the ability to select information sources, a
majority of people do not actively avoid information that challenges their own
views. Other studies use more controlled environments to examine how people
select information sources. A closest related study to this paper is Chen and Yang
(2019). They use a field experiment in China to investigate people’s information
acquisition behavior when they are given access to uncensored Internet. It is
no secret that China develops a sophisticated Internet censorship apparatus to
restrict access to regime-threatening information. In this specific context, they
find that temporarily offering free access alone does not lead to more acquisi-
tion of politically sensitive information, unless people are incentivized to do so.
They also find that acquiring politically sensitive information causes substantial
and persistent changes in citizens’ knowledge, beliefs, attitudes, and intended
behaviors. Hjort et al. (2019) investigates how policy-makers demand research
findings that may inform them about the effectiveness of policies. They find that
policy-makers are willing to pay for policy-related research results, and update
their beliefs when informed of those findings. They do not find evidence for con-
firmation bias or information acquisition driven by motivated reasoning. In an
abstract setting, Charness et al. (2018) studies how people choose between two
information sources that are biased toward or against their prior beliefs. They
find that subjects are systematically prone to confirmatory information. In the
current paper, we combine a naturally-occurring issue with a controlled informa-
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tion environment in which people are neutral to both the involved issue and the
information environment.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the ex-
perimental design and the main hypotheses. Section 3 provides the main results.
Section 4 explores the mechanisms, and Section 5 concludes.
4.2 Experimental design
This section first outlines a pilot experiment which aims at selecting an issue
that reduces the influence of motivated reasoning and confirmation bias as much
as possible. Based on the results of the pilot, we choose an issue that best fits our
need for the main experiment. Then we describe the main experiment.5 Finally,
we describe the outcome variables of interest and formulate our hypotheses.
The reason why we do not use an abstract setting, for example, a setting in
which subjects form beliefs about the value of a unknown variable based on the
signals they receive, is that we are interested in how people deal with informa-
tion slant embedded in natural language. While an abstract setting as in Enke
(2020) can easily get rid of motivated reasoning, it would also take away the
subjectivity that makes information slant.
4.2.1 Pilot: issue selection
An ideal issue for the experiment does not invoke ego driven or self-interest
driven reasoning, and people have not formed strong opinions about it so that
they would not suffer from confirmation bias. So to maximize the chance of find-
ing an ideal issue, we restricted our attention to a few topics that are either new
(recent scientific and technological developments) or exotic to our target subjects.
In the pilot, we tested a list of candidate topics:
• Genetically modified (GMO) mosquitoes to prevent disease spread by limit-
ing their reproduction
• Traditional Chinese medicine
• Complementary and alternative medicine
• The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
5The experiment and the analysis plan were pre-registered on the AEA RCT Registry
(AEARCTR-0005595). For more details, see Appendix D.
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For each of the above topics, we asked respondents four questions: how well
they know the topic, whether they hold strong prior attitudes toward the topic,
whether they are comfortable with evidence against their opinions on the topic,
and whether they think these issues are important and relevant. The first two
questions are our criteria for selecting the topic.
We recruited 163 Mturk workers for the pilot. Among all the topics that we
tested, genetically modified (GMO) mosquito is the topic that respondents have
the least knowledge about and the weakest prior attitudes toward. We then
constructed a more concrete and specific issue within this topic, which will be
explained in the next section.
4.2.2 Main experiment
Overview
The experiment consists of two parts: a pre-screening survey and the main
experiment. The pre-screening survey is designed to screen out respondents
who already hold strong prior attitudes toward GMO mosquitoes and those who
are very knowledgeable about GMO mosquitoes. Subjects who pass the pre-
screening are immediately invited to continue with the main experiment.
In the pre-screening survey, participants are first briefly introduced to the
topic, GMO mosquitoes. We then ask them: (1) how much do you know about ge-
netically modified mosquitoes without searching online? and (2) what is your
general attitude toward GMO mosquitoes? For the first question, they state
their answers on a five-point scale from “none at all” to “a great deal”. For the
second question, they choose from “extremely negative” to “extremely positive”
on a five-point scale. Only those who do not know “a great deal” about GMO
mosquitoes and are neither “extremely negative” nor “extremely positive” about
GMO mosquitoes are invited to participate in the second part of the study, which
is the main experiment.
The issue we are using in the main experiment is “releasing genetically modi-
fied mosquitoes in the wild to eliminate disease-carrying mosquitoes”. There are
two mutually-exclusive sides of the issue, whether one supports or opposes such
practices. For simplicity, we refer to the two sides as pro-GMO and anti-GMO in
the remaining of this paper.
Figure 4.1 overviews the experimental setup. We implement a 3x2 (Both/Pro/Anti
◊ Exo/Endo) between-subject design. Two treatment variations occur in two
phases of the experiment. In phase I, we vary what information subjects are
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initially exposed to. In phase II, we vary whether subsequent arguments from
both sides are exogenously imposed or can be endogenously selected. In total, we
have six treatment groups.
Figure 4.1: Overview of Treatments
In phase I, subjects are exposed to one of the two slanted versions of infor-
mation or both. The initial information takes the form of an article on the issue.
We construct two versions of the article: a pro-GMO version and an anti-GMO
version. These two articles are based on the same underlying facts published
in academic journals or news reports but are slanted toward one side of the is-
sue or the other side (see Appendix A). Subjects assigned to the Both condition
read both versions while those assigned to Pro/Anti conditions read either the
pro-GMO article or the anti-GMO article.
In phase II, subjects have access to subsequent information from both sides.
The subsequent information we provide is eight arguments, each of which favors
either the pro-GMO side or the anti-GMO side. Half of the subjects are ran-
domly assigned to the Exo condition and are required to read and evaluate all
arguments from both sides. The other half of the subjects are assigned to the
Endo condition. They are able to select how many arguments to read from either
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side.
Both.Exo is the benchmark group. For data analyses, sometimes we pool to-
gether the data of several treatment groups. In such case, we name the pooled
data by the treatment variation shared by these pooled treatment groups. For
example, Pro groups are Pro.Endo group and Pro.Exo group pooled together.
The two phases each consists of several stages as summarized below. The
details of each stage will be given in the next section.
• Phase I:
– Stage 1.1: exposure to one of the slanted articles or both;
– Stage 1.2: elicitation of attitudes about the use of GMO mosquitoes;
– Stage 1.3: elicitation of estimates of the benchmark’s attitude about
the use of GMO mosquitoes;
• Phase II:
– Stage 2.1: information acquisition/evaluation;
– Stage 2.2: elicitation of attitudes about the use of GMO mosquitoes;
– Stage 2.3: elicitation of estimates of the benchmark’s attitude about
the use of GMO mosquitoes;
– Stage 2.4: demographics.
Stages
This section explains the experimental setup stage by stage in more detail. Sam-
ple Instructions can be found in Appendix C.
Stage 1.1: exposure to one of the slanted articles or both We begin by
bringing up the issue, genetically modified (GMO) mosquito. In this stage, sub-
jects read an article or two articles on a genetically modified mosquitoes field
practice in Brazil. We write two versions of the article that are based on the
same underlying facts published in academic journals or news reports but are
slanted towards either the pro-GMO side or the anti-GMO side (see Appendix
A).
Subjects in Both treatments read both versions which are presented in a ran-
dom order. Subjects in Pro or Anti groups receive only the pro-GMO version or
only the anti-GMO version respectively. All subjects are explicitly told that there
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exist two versions. They are also informed which version(s) they will read and
that it is randomly determined.
When they finish reading, we ask a few comprehension questions about the
article to make sure that the subjects have actually read it and more importantly
that they have grasped the critical facts in the article. Subjects should answer
all comprehension questions correctly in order to proceed. They can try as many
times as they need and if they are unsure about the answers, they can go back to
the article(s).
Stage 1.2: elicitation of attitudes toward the use of GMO mosquitoes
We use two measures of attitude toward the issue. First, subjects report on a
nine point scale whether they think the practice of releasing GMO mosquitoes
to prevent the spread of disease is appropriate use of technology or is taking
technology too far.6 Second, we ask subjects to allocate a donation worth of 100
dollars between a pro-GMO mosquito organization7 and an anti-GMO mosquito
organization8. We inform subjects that we make the donation according to the
average of all responses. Subjects’ responses are recorded as their first attitudes.
Stage 1.3: elicitation of estimates of the benchmark’s attitude Subjects
in the benchmark group skip this stage. Subjects in the other five treatment
groups are asked to estimate the average attitude of the benchmark group, more
specifically, the average allocation out of 100 dollars to the pro-GMO organiza-
tion by subjects in the benchmark group. Subjects choose an interval for their
estimates. For example, they can state that the average percentage of donation
allocated to the pro-GMO organization is between 45% and 55% by dragging the
ends of a slider. They will earn a bonus worth up to one dollar if the actual
average allocation of the benchmark group falls into the interval they choose.
The amount of the bonus decreases linearly in the width of the interval.9 Their
responses are recorded as the first estimates.
6This question was used by PEW in its survey on Americans’ views on genetic engineering of
Animals
7The pro-GMO mosquito organization, Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine, is a research insti-
tute that has a team dedicated to developing toolkits for the genetic manipulation of insects to fight
against diseases.
8The anti-GMO mosquito organization, GeneWatch, is a not-for-profit group that monitors devel-
opments in genetic technologies. This organization believes that GMO mosquitoes are a mistake and
should be avoided in the future.
9The amount of bonus equals to 100 cents minus the difference between the upper bound per-
centage point and the lower bound percentage point of the interval subjects choose. In the above
example, the bonus amount equals to 100 ≠ (55 ≠ 45) = 90 cents.
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Stage 2.1: information acquisition/evaluation In this stage, subjects have
free access to in total eight arguments from both pro-GMO side and the anti-
GMO side. We construct these arguments on the basis of answers posted on
Quora. We picked 4 arguments in favor of the pro-GMO side and 4 in favor of
the anti-GMO side, and rewrote them such that they are comparable in terms
of length and clarity. Each argument takes a native English speaker around 20
seconds to read.
Subjects in the three Exo treatment groups are shown all eight arguments
while subjects in the three Endo treatment groups can choose how many ar-
guments to read from either side. Additionally, subjects are asked to rate how
convincing each argument they read is on a seven point scale.
Stage 2.2: elicitation of attitudes toward GMO mosquitoes This stage is
a repetition of stage 1.2. Subjects’ responses are recorded as their final attitudes.
Stage 2.3: elicitation of estimates of the benchmark’s attitude For all
subjects except those in the benchmark group, this stage is a repetition of stage
1.3. Their responses are recorded as the final estimates. Additionally, we ask
them to estimate the first attitude of their opposing side. That is, subjects in Pro
groups estimate the average first attitude of those in Anti groups and vice versa.
Subjects earn an extra bonus of 50 cents if they are correct.10
Subjects in the benchmark group skip stage 1.3. Now they are asked to esti-
mate the average attitude of the benchmark group for the first time. We record
their responses as the final estimates. So subjects in the benchmark group do
not have “first” estimates.
Stage 2.4: demographics Finally, we collect basic demographics ( gender, age,
education, income, state of residence, religion), political preferences, and news
consumption habits.
4.2.3 Outcome variables and Hypotheses
Outcome variables of interest
Self-reported attitude toward GMO mosquitoes The first measure of at-
titude is self-reported attitude. Specifically, subjects state on a scale of [-4,4]
10We ask subjects to submit a whole number as their point estimate. If the point estimate coincides
with the true percentage (rounded to a whole number), they earn 50 cents.
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whether it is taking technology too far or is appropriate use of technology to re-
lease GMO mosquitoes to eliminate disease-carrying mosquitoes.
Donation to the pro-GMO organization The second measure of attitude is
the proportion ([0,100]) of donation they would like to allocate to the pro-GMO
organization.
Remember that we elicit each measure of attitude, that is, self-reported at-
titude and donation, in both phase I and phase II. The phase I attitude will be
referred to as the first attitude, and the phase II attitude will be referred to as
the final attitude. For subjects in the benchmark group, we elicit their attitudes
only once at the end of phase II as their final attitude.
Estimate of the benchmark’s final donation This outcome variable is self-
explanatory, i.e., subjects’ estimates of the average final percentage of donation
allocated to the pro-GMO organization by the benchmark group. Subjects choose
an interval for the estimate. We use the middle point of the interval as the point
estimate.
We are most concerned about subjects’ attitudes toward GMO mosquitoes.
Self-reported attitude is straightforward but cheap talk. We choose a second
measure–the donation decision–because it has real consequences and reflects
one’s attitude toward GMO mosquitoes. The donation decision is incentivized
in some sense, but it may be driven by other motives, for example, concerns for
the quality of the organization. We also elicit subjects’ estimates of the bench-
mark group’s attitude because the estimates may be related to one’s own attitude
due to social projection and we use this elicitation to incentivize information ac-
quisition. These three outcome variables complement each other and we expect
them to correlate with each other.
Information acquisition We are interested in the total number of arguments
subjects in Endo groups acquire and the relative numbers of pro-GMO and anti-
GMO arguments they acquire.
Information evaluation This outcome variable is subjects’ evaluation of the
convincingness of each acquired argument on a seven point Likert scale: [-3,3].
Hypotheses
In this section, we formulate our hypotheses based on existing literature.
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Phase I: the impact of information slant on first self-reported attitudes,
donations, and estimates By design, we restrict our attention to subjects
who have little knowledge and mild attitudes about GMO mosquitoes prior to
our experimental manipulation. It is unlikely that they are attached to either
side to begin with. And Pro and Anti groups are informed that they will receive
an article slanted toward one side of the issue and toward which side exactly.
In principle, there should be no difference in the attitudes across treatments,
since the pro-GMO article and the anti-GMO articles are randomly assigned to
subjects and the two articles share the same underlying facts.
However, as literature shows, people can still be affected by information known
to be partial.11 Our first hypothesis is that subjects will still be affected by infor-
mation slant. Specifically, those exposed to only one of the slanted articles will
be “biased”12 toward the side aligned with initial article relative to those exposed
to both slanted articles. That is,
Hypothesis 4.1 (Att). Pro groups are more positive about the use of GMO mosquitoes
than Both groups. Anti groups are more negative about the use of GMO mosquitoes
than Both groups.
Social projection (Katz et al., 1931; Mullen et al., 1985; Mullen and Hu, 1988)
suggests that, when people are asked to predict others’ preferences based on lim-
ited information, “it is reasonable to assume that other people prefer the same
things that we do” (Tarantola et al., 2017). In the context of our study, if subjects’
attitudes are affected by information slant, that is, we find evidence to support
Hypothesis Att, then social projection leads to the hypothesis that subjects ex-
posed to information slant will be biased in the direction of their own attitudes
when estimating the benchmark’s attitude.
Hypothesis 4.2 (Est). Pro groups’ estimates of the benchmark’s attitude are
higher than those of Both groups. Anti groups’ estimates are lower than those
of Both groups.
Note that phase I of the experiment, in which subjects are exposed to infor-
mation slant, sets the stage for phase II. We test Hypothesis Att to check if our
11For a review on the persuasion effect, see DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2010).
12Note that the word “biased” here is not normative as we can never define what is the unbiased
attitude toward GMO mosquitoes by any objective standard. We use Both groups as the benchmark
without claiming that Both groups are unbiased or that everyone should possess the same attitude as
Both groups do. We refer to “bias” in attitudes as the difference between Pro/Anti treatment groups
and Both groups.
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“manipulation” works. If yes, we move on to the main hypotheses regarding sub-
sequent information acquisition and its effect on attitudes and estimates.
Phase II: subsequent information acquisition Subjects have a monetary
incentive to accurately estimate the benchmark’s final attitude. We inform the
subjects that the benchmark group has seen all of the eight arguments. There-
fore, we hypothesize that subjects acquire all the available information in order
for an accurate estimate.
Hypothesis 4.3 (InfoAcq). Subjects in Endo groups acquire all of the eight argu-
ments.
Since there is a tradeoff between the expected amount of bonus and the time
spent on reading the arguments, not acquiring all the arguments does not nec-
essarily indicate irrationality. In cases where Hypothesis InfoAcq is rejected,
we then form an alternative hypothesis concerning how subjects choose between
arguments from both sides, in particular, whether subjects are confirmation-
seeking, contradiction-seeking, or neither. A large literature suggests that peo-
ple tend to look for information that confirms their prior beliefs (Charness et al.,
2018; Frey, 1986; Iyengar and Hahn, 2009; Klayman and Ha, 1987; Pariser, 2011;
Prior, 2007; Sears and Freedman, 1967). While contraction-seeking behavior ex-
ists in theory, it is extremely rare in empirical studies. Thus, we hypothesize
that people display confirmation-seeking behavior at the aggregate level, that is,
they acquire more arguments from the side aligned with the initial article than
arguments from the other side.
Hypothesis 4.4 (InfoSeek). Subjects in Pro.Endo group acquire more pro-GMO
arguments than anti-GMO arguments. Subjects in Anti.Endo group acquire more
anti-GMO arguments than pro-GMO arguments.
Phase II: attitudes, donations, and estimates after endogenous informa-
tion acquisition Conditional on finding support for Hypothesis Att, we expect
subjects’ attitudes and estimates to move toward convergence after information
acquisition.
However, we cannot predict how close attitudes and estimates eventually are,
since it depends on the degree of divergence and the relative strength of the
arguments.
Hypothesis 4.5 (Endo). In Endo groups, attitudes and estimates of different
sides move toward convergence after information acquisition.
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Phase II: the impact of exogenous information There is a chance that sub-
jects in Endo groups acquire very few or no argument. In such cases, we are not
able to test the effect of subsequent information on attitudes. So we add the
Exo treatment and ask subjects in Exo groups to read and evaluate all the argu-
ments. If more common information helps narrow the gap in attitudes, subjects
in Exo groups would move closer in attitudes to a greater extent than those in
Endo groups after information evaluation.
Hypothesis 4.6 (Exo). In Exo groups, attitudes and estimates of different sides




We recruited subjects through Mturkdata13 in May 2020. A total of 969 respon-
dents completed the pre-screening survey. 802 (82.7%) of them are not very
knowledgeable and do not have extreme attitudes about GMO mosquitoes.14
These respondents were immediately invited to participate in the main exper-
iment. After excluding incomplete responses, we collected 716 observations in
total, with more than 100 observations in each treatment group.
The pre-screening survey takes less than 1 minute. Respondents earn 5 cents
by finishing it. The main experiment that immediately follows takes 15-20 min-
utes. Respondents who agreed to participate earned at least 2 dollars by com-
pleting the main experiment. Additionally, they could earn a bonus depending
on their responses to the incentivized questions. The average bonus is 30 cents.
Upon recruitment, we made it clear to Mturk workers that after completing
the 1 minute survey, they might be invited to participate in a follow-up study
and we mentioned the length and payment of the follow-up study. Participation
in the follow-up study was voluntary. Attrition is not a concern, because only 36
invited respondents (less than 5%) did not continue with the follow-up study and
they do not differ from those who agreed to continue in terms of prior attitude
and knowledge.
13Mturkdata is a platform that helps publish studies on the Mturk platform.
14The pre-screening question on attitude is: what is your general attitude toward genetically mod-
ified (GMO) mosquitoes? Subjects choose their attitude from 5 categories that range from “extremely
negative” to “extremely positive”.
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Table 2 in Appendix E presents summary statistics about the subjects who
completed the main experiment.
Randomization check Randomization was done by a randomizer embedded
in the survey. It was mostly successful, except that subjects’ prior attitudes about
GMO mosquitoes are statistically different across treatments at the 10% level;
see Appendix E. Therefore, we control for priors in the subsequent analyses.
4.3.2 Main results
In this section, we first examine how much subjects’ attitudes and estimates are
affected by information slant when they are aware thereof. We then explore to
what extent they use the opportunity to acquire additional information from both
sides to counteract the impact of information slant. Finally, we discuss the effect
of exogenously imposed information.
Does information slant affect attitudes and estimates?
As a manipulation check, we start by looking at the effects of one-sided evidence
on subjects’ attitudes and estimates. Remember that we use two measures of at-
titudes: the self-reported attitude towards the practice of using GMO mosquitoes
to eliminate mosquito-carrying diseases and the allocation of donation between
a pro-GMO organization and an anti-GMO organization. The third outcome of
interest is subjects’ estimates of the benchmark’s allocation decision, which are
hypothesized to be correlated with the attitudes.
Figure 4.2 shows the average self-reported attitude toward GMO mosquitoes,
average donation to the pro-GMO organization, and the average estimate of
the benchmark’s attitude among subjects in Pro groups, Both groups, and Anti
groups.15
The impact of information slant on attitudes is evident. In terms of the self-
reported attitude, subjects who read a pro-GMO article are significantly more
positive toward the use of GMO mosquitoes than those who read both articles
(Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.014). And subjects who read an anti-GMO article
are significantly more negative toward the usage of GMO mosquitoes than those
who read both articles (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.012). information slant affects
the allocation of donation in a similar manner but to a smaller extent. Subjects
15We had not mentioned anything about the possibility of reading more arguments until phase II.
Therefore, we do not distinguish subjects in the Exogenous and Endogenous groups in phase I.
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Figure 4.2: Phase I: average self-reported attitude, average donation to the pro-
GMO organization, and average estimate of the benchmark’s donation to the
pro-GMO organization among all subjects. Self-reported attitude is normalized
to [-1,1].
in Pro groups allocate a significantly larger fraction of donation to the pro-GMO
organization than those in the Anti groups (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.001), yet
neither Pro groups nor Anti groups are statistically different from Both groups
(Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.204 and p = 0.235 respectively).
However, we do not find any difference in the estimates of the benchmark’s
attitude. Subjects in all treatment groups predominantly locate their guesses
around 50%, whereas the actual percentage of final donation allocated to pro-
GMO organization made by the benchmark group is 58% (see Figure 11 in the
appendix). This result suggests that social projection does not seem to play much
of a role when subjects are incentivized to estimate others’ attitude.
In sum, the evidence supports Hypothesis Att but not Hypothesis Est. The
results are summarized below:
Result 4.1. (Att) After being exposed to information slant, Pro groups hold a more
positive attitude toward GMO mosquitoes than Both groups and Anti groups have
a more negative attitude toward GMO mosquitoes than Both groups.
Result 4.2. (Est) information slant does not cause divergence among subjects in
their estimates of the benchmark group’s attitude.
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Next, we look at what people do when they are offered access to more infor-
mation from both sides and if endogenous information acquisition can narrow
the gap in attitudes.
Does information acquisition mitigate the impact of information slant?
Information acquisition pattern We hypothesize that subjects in Endo groups
acquire all the arguments in order to estimate the benchmark’s attitude more ac-
curately.
Figure 4.3 below presents the cumulative distribution of the number of ac-
quired arguments. In fact, only 25.1% of the subjects choose to read all argu-
ments. 68% of them read four or even less arguments. The information acquisi-
tion patterns are very similar across the three treatment groups. Therefore, we
reject Hypothesis InfoAcq and turn to Hypothesis InfoSeek.
Figure 4.3: CDF of the total number of arguments acquired among subjects in
Pro.Endo group, in Both.Endo group, and in Anti.Endo group.
We hypothesize that subjects may acquire more confirming arguments than
contradicting ones if they do not acquire all the available arguments. However,
subjects do not seem to discriminate between information from different sides:
85.6% of them choose equal numbers of pro-GMO arguments and anti-GMO ar-
guments. We find no difference in the relative numbers of acquired arguments
from the two sides across treatment groups, and hence we reject Hypothesis In-
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Figure 4.4: Change in self-reported attitude, donation to the pro-GMO organi-
zation, and estimate among subjects in Pro.Endo group, Both.Endo group and
Anti.Endo group.
foSeek. Taken together, we have the following results:
Result 4.3. (InfoAcq) The majority of the subjects do not acquire all the available
information even when they are incentivized to do so.
Result 4.4. (InfoSeek) Subjects do not display a confirmation-seeking pattern in
information acquisition; they predominantly choose equal numbers of arguments
from both sides.
Do attitudes and estimates converge after information acquisition? Again,
we focus on subjects in Endo groups. To see if attitudes are converging, we
compare subjects’ attitudes, donations, and estimates before and after informa-
tion acquisition. Figure 4.4 below demonstrates the change in the self-reported
attitude, the change in the donation allocation, and change in the estimate of
the benchmark’s attitude after information acquisition among subjects in Endo
groups.
While self-reported attitudes and estimates of the benchmark’s attitude barely
change at the treatment level, we find some evidence that donation decisions
move closer; see Figure 8 and Figure 9 in the appendix for more details. Specif-
ically, subjects in Pro.Endo and in Both.Endo lower their donations to the pro-
GMO organization by 5 percentage points, more than subjects in Anti.Endo do
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(Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.168). This renders the difference in the final dona-
tion allocation between Pro.Endo and Anti.Endo non-significant (Mann-Whitney
test, p = 0.279), which was statistically significant before information acquisition
(Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.042). In other words, the three treatment groups are
converging in their donation decisions after information acquisition. The result
provides some support for Hypothesis Endo.
Result 4.5. (Endo) There is mild evidence that attitudes are converging among
people who are initially exposed to diverse information after information acquisi-
tion.
Summing up the results so far, we find that information slant indeed affects
subjects’ attitudes and causes an evident gap between people exposed to differ-
ent sides. The gap narrows slightly when subjects are given the opportunity to
acquire more information from both sides, although subjects do not exploit this
opportunity in the sense that the majority of them acquire no more than half of
all the available information. Next, we investigate if imposing all the informa-
tion on subjects would narrow the gap in attitudes to a greater extent.
Does exogenously imposed information mitigate the impact of informa-
tion slant?
Contrary to what we hypothesize, there is no evidence of convergence in attitudes
among subjects in Exo groups. Figure 4.5 presents the change in self-reported
attitude, the change in donation allocation, and the change in estimate of the
benchmark’s attitude among subjects in Exo groups by the side of the initial in-
formation. The self-reported attitude of Both.Exo and Anti.Exo are significantly
different from Pro.Exo and they remain so after subjects read all the arguments;
see Figure 10 and Figure 11 in the appendix. The gap in donation allocation
is even wider, as Anti.Exo lowers their donation after reading the arguments.
As a result, the difference in donation allocation between Pro.Exo and Anti.Exo
becomes statistically significant at the 10% level (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.062).
As to the estimates, the benchmark group is the most accurate among the
three treatment groups in estimating its own final donation: the average guess
of the benchmark group is 55.8% while the truth percentage is 58%. Meanwhile,
both Pro.Exo and Anti.Exo underestimate the donation made by the benchmark
group, but their guesses are not statistically different from each other (Mann-
Whitney test, p = 0.72).
In sum, we reject Hypothesis Exo:
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Figure 4.5: Change in average self-reported attitude, average donation to the
pro-GMO organization, and average estimate among subjects in Pro.Exo group,
Both.Exo group and Anti.Exo group.
Result 4.6. (Exo) We find no evidence that exogenously imposed information
leads to greater convergence of attitudes among subjects who are initially exposed
to diverse information than among subjects who can endogenously acquire infor-
mation.
While endogenous information acquisition slightly narrows the gap in atti-
tude induced by initial slanted articles, forcing subsequent information from both
sides on people does not; it may even backfire. This raises a question as to why
imposed information widens the gap in attitudes, which remains to be further
investigated.
4.4 Mechanisms
Previous results show that information slant has an impact on people’s attitudes
even when they are aware thereof. In particular, it causes a gap in attitudes
among people who are exposed to diverse information. The opportunity to ac-
quire more information from both sides only slightly mitigates the impact of in-
formation slant, while imposing information from both sides seems to do the
opposite. In this section, we discuss two mechanisms that may hinder people
from counteracting the impact of information slant.
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4.4.1 Awareness of the impact of information slant
People do not make efforts to counteract the impact of information slant possibly
because they are not aware that information slant may have an impact. In this
section, we show evidence that can rule out this possibility.
In stage 2.3, we ask subjects who receive only one article to estimate the first
average attitude of their opposing side, i.e. the first allocation decision made by
those who read an article of the opposing side. By comparing their estimates of
the benchmark group’s attitude and the opposing side’s attitude, we are able to
see if subjects expect a discrepancy in attitudes between those who receive only
one slanted article and those who receive both articles. Put it differently, suppose
a subject A receives article HA, a subject B receives article HB , and a subject C
receives both articles: HA + HB . We ask subject A to estimate the attitude of B
and the attitude of C. The difference between these two estimates is subject A’s
belief about the effects of article HA on attitudes. If the difference is non-zero,
then we may conclude that subject A expects information slant to affect people’s
attitude.
Figure 4.6 organizes the estimate of the benchmark group’s attitude and the
estimate of the opposing side’s attitude given by Pro groups and Anti groups. The
left panel compares Pro groups’ average estimate of the benchmark’s attitude
and their average estimate of Anti groups’ attitude. Pro groups believe that Anti
groups allocate a smaller fraction (34.4% v.s. 51.3%) of the donation to the pro-
GMO organization than Both groups would allocate. The right panel of Figure 4.6
shows the Anti groups’ estimate of the benchmark’s attitude and their estimate
of Pro groups’ attitude. They believe that Pro groups would allocate a larger
fraction (57.7% v.s. 49.2%) of the donation to the pro-GMO organization than
Both groups. The pairwise differences between the two estimates are significant
at 1% level (Mann-Whitney test). In other words, subjects believe that those who
have read two articles are more positive than those who only read an anti-GMO
article and are more negative than those who only read a pro-GMO article.
The results demonstrate that subjects expect an impact of information slant
on attitudes, at least on others’ attitudes. In fact, while people correctly antici-
pate the direction of the impact, they overestimate its magnitude: the true differ-
ence in donation allocation between Pro/Anti groups and Both groups is smaller
than what subjects expect and the true difference is not statistically significant.
Thus, the result that subjects do not fully counteract the impact of information
slant cannot be explained by a lack of awareness of either the one-sided nature
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Figure 4.6: Estimates of the attitude of Benchmark and the attitude of the oppo-
site side by the Pro groups and the Anti groups.
of the initial information or its impact on attitudes.
4.4.2 Induced confirmation bias
We argue that we minimize the role of confirmation bias by selecting an issue
toward which subjects did not have strong priors. However, it could happen that
subjects quickly adopt certain attitudes or views over the course of reading the
initial slanted article. As information slant causes a shift in attitudes, it may in
turn induces a confirmation bias that prevents people from fully counteracting
its impact through subsequent information acquisition.
To investigate the induced confirmation bias that comes after initial infor-
mation, we compare how subjects across treatments rate the convincingness of
the arguments they read.16 The eight arguments are sorted into pro-GMO ar-
guments and anti-GMO arguments. For subjects in Endo groups, we randomly
select arguments from the pro-GMO argument pool and the anti-GMO argument
pool depending on how many arguments they want to read from either side, and
we present the selected arguments to them in a random order. Subjects in Exo
groups read eight arguments in a random order. We use the mean rating on
16We demonstrate in more detail subjects’ evaluation of each argument and the effects of reading
each argument on the attitudes in Appendix H.
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Figure 4.7: Evaluation of pro-GMO and anti-GMO arguments by subjects in Anti
groups, Both groups, and Pro groups. Ratings are normalized to [-1,1].
pro-GMO arguments of each subject to measure how she evaluates pro-GMO in-
formation and her mean rating on anti-GMO arguments as her evaluation of
anti-GMO information, if she chooses to read any. In the absence of confirmation
bias, we should find subjects in all treatment groups rate pro-GMO arguments
similarly, and likewise anti-GMO arguments.
The right panel of Figure 4.7 shows the average ratings on pro-GMO argu-
ments given by Pro groups, Both groups, and Anti groups. The left panel presents
the average ratings on anti-GMO arguments given by Pro groups, Both groups,
and Anti groups. Pro-GMO arguments are significantly more convincing in the
eyes of Pro groups than they are in the eyes of Anti groups (Mann-Whitney test,
p = 0.021). Anti-GMO arguments are more convincing judged by Anti groups
than judged by Pro groups, although the difference is not statistically significant
(Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.16). The results constitute evidence of the confirma-
tion bias induced by information slant.
How does confirmation bias affect attitudes? Denote the difference between
one’s evaluation of pro-GMO arguments and one’s evaluation of anti-GMO argu-
ments as di. The larger di is, the more this subject is “biased” in favor of GMO
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mosquitoes in evaluating the arguments. We then estimate
 atti = “0 + ◊di + ‡Sidei + Xi— + ‘i (4.1)
where  atti = attposti ≠ att
pre
i
is the change of individual i’s self-reported attitude
or donation before and after information acquisition. Self-reported attitude is
normalized to [-1,1]. Donation ranges from 0 to 100. Sidei indicates the side of
the initial information individual i receives: it equals to 1 if the subject reads a
pro-GMO article, -1 if the subject reads an anti-GMO article and 0 if the subject
reads both articles. Xi is a vector that controls for the individual’s prior attitude
toward GMO mosquitoes and her knowledge about GMO mosquitoes in the pre-
screening survey.
The results are presented in Table 4.1. Subjects become more positive about
the use of GMO mosquitoes if they find pro-GMO arguments more convincing
relative to anti-GMO arguments. The degree of bias in evaluation is a significant
predictor of the change in attitudes. When the bias in evaluation is controlled
for, the initial information does not affect the change in attitudes.




Bias in evaluation: di 0.175úúú 5.242úúú
(0.022) (1.420)
Initial information: Sidei ≠0.020 ≠0.759
(0.014) (0.944)
Prior attitude ≠0.053úúú ≠2.887úú
(0.018) (1.193)






Adjusted R2 0.084 0.027
Note: úp<0.1; úúp<0.05; úúúp<0.01
The results in this section suggest that information slant has a persistent
effect: it affects not only people’s attitudes, but also the way people process sub-
sequent information. People are “persuaded” by the initial information slant and
subsequently suffer from confirmation bias when evaluating further information
from both sides, which in turn reinforces the impact of information slant on at-
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titudes. This behavioral mechanism provides a plausible explanation for why
offering more common information fails to close the gap between different sides
and why forcing more information on people may even backfire.
4.5 Conclusions
In this study, we show that people do not fully counteract the impact of informa-
tion slant even when they are aware thereof. People could quickly pick up certain
attitude that is randomly assigned to them over a course as short as an article.
As a result, information slant creates a gap in attitudes among those who are
exposed to different sets of information. Offering free access to more information
from both sides only slightly narrows the gap in attitudes, while exogenously im-
posed information does the opposite. Moreover, we find that information slant
shifts people’s attitudes and in turn induces a confirmation bias when people
evaluate subsequent information.
The key feature of our study is that we try to create an environment such that
people have the best chance to counteract the impact of information slant. Yet,
our results demonstrate how easily information slant can sway people’s thinking
and how challenging it is to adjust for its impact. These results call for cau-
tion on both the supply and the demand side of the information market. On the
supply side, it should be noted that warning consumers of potentially biased in-
formation is not a substitute of providing balanced information. On the demand
side, consumers should perhaps pay more attention to the selection of informa-
tion sources, as the initial information they are exposed to seems to play a role
in determining their attitudes that deliberation struggles to underplay.
This study leaves a couple of directions of future research. For instance, it
remains to be investigated whether information slant affects beliefs about ver-
ifiable facts related to GMO mosquitoes or other issues in the broader topic of
gene-modification and how persistent its impact is. This question also concerns
another result that we find intriguing: while subjects exposed to one slanted ar-
ticle believe that those who receive both slanted articles think differently than
they do, they stick to their own attitudes. Exploring the impact of information
slant on factual beliefs may shed more light on the open question as to whether
those who have seen information from both sides are epistemically more superior
to those exposed to only one side. In a different direction, it would be interesting
to study why exogenously imposed information from both sides seems to increase
rather than decrease polarization in attitudes. More specifically, does it matter
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if information is imposed or endogenously chosen? Are people overloaded with
all the available information? The answers may be relevant to developing better
debiasing strategies.
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Appendix A. Information slant
Pro-GMO article
Between 2013 and 2015 a British high-tech company had released about 450,000
male genetically modified (GMO) mosquitoes every week in Brazil, in an effort to
eliminate a disease-carrying species of mosquitoes. These GMO mosquitoes are
expected to pass on the modified genes that prevent their offspring from reaching
the adult stage and reproducing. The practice was a huge success. The release
of GMO mosquitoes worked tremendously well by reducing local mosquito popu-
lations by 90% during the trial.
Recently, a team of independent researchers claimed in a published study that
some offspring of the GMO mosquitoes survived and reproduced. As a result, the
gene of GMO mosquitoes may have been transferred to the local population. “The
important thing is something unanticipated happened,” says one of the authors.
In fact, it was not “unanticipated”, nor is it a problem. Some of the authors
have shown in their previous work that the transgene is lost from the population
over time. Yet, intentionally or unintentionally, that important piece of work
is omitted in the current study. “Unfortunately, the study’s authors used drama-
tized statements to create unfounded concern, ignoring scientific evidence within
their own study,” says the company which feels like being unfairly criticized.
Last month, Nature Research, which published the study, added an editor’s
note to the paper saying its conclusions are subject to valid criticisms that should
be addressed. Nature Research offered the authors the opportunity to submit
a correction. Several authors acknowledge the criticisms and they have been
struggling to fully address them.
After all, both the study and the company agree that there’s no evidence that
these hybrids of GMO mosquito and local mosquito endanger humans more than
the wild mosquitoes; nor is there any evidence that the company’s strategy is
rendered ineffective.
Anti-GMO article
Between 2013 and 2015 a British high-tech company had released about 450,000
male genetically modified (GMO) mosquitoes every week in Brazil, in an effort to
eliminate a disease-carrying species of mosquitoes. These GMO mosquitoes are
expected to pass on the modified genes that prevent their offspring from reaching
the adult stage and reproducing. The release of GMO mosquitoes seemed to
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work. The local mosquito population was reduced substantially, yet, almost 10%
of them remained active.
Recently, a team of independent researchers warned in a published study that
some offspring of the GMO mosquitoes not only survived unexpectedly but were
able to reproduce. As a result, the gene of GMO mosquitoes has been transferred
to the local population. In other words, the experiment may have unintended
consequences and even backfired by creating a hybrid of GMO mosquito and
local mosquito.
Although the study and the company agree that there’s no evidence yet that
these hybrids endanger humans more than the wild mosquitoes or that they’ll
render the company’s strategy ineffective, “the important thing is something
unanticipated happened,” says one of the authors. One may easily wonder whether
manual intervention makes these hybrids become even stronger.
The study triggered an aggressive push-back from the company, which ob-
viously has a lot at stake. “Unfortunately, the study’s authors used dramatized
statements to create unfounded concern, ignoring scientific evidence within their
own study,” says the company. It claims that some of the authors did not mention
other work of theirs on how the transgene is decreasing in the population over
time.
Last month, Nature Research, which published the study, added an editor’s
note to the paper saying its conclusions are subject to scientific concerns and
offered the authors the opportunity to submit a response. While some of the




Pro-GMO 1 Mosquitoes and the diseases they spread (e.g. malaria) kill more
people than wars. While the threat is real, traditional methods are proven in-
effective in controlling mosquitoes. For instance, because mosquitoes reproduce
and evolve within days, chemical pesticides only help them grow resistance as
long as they are not entirely eradicated. We definitely need new technology.
Pro-GMO 2 The effect of GMO mosquitoes on eco-system is really minimal.
GMO mosquitoes target at a specific disease-carrying mosquito species while
leaving other harmless species or beneficial insects alive. There are no birds,
fish, or other insects that depend solely on the species to be eliminated. It does
not pollinate flowers or regulate the growth of plants. With GMO mosquitoes,
we do not add toxic chemicals to the environment, which actually protects the
eco-system.
Pro-GMO 3 So far there has been no proven risk of the practice in any aspect.
Researchers show that the GMO mosquitoes are not more likely to carry infec-
tious diseases than the mosquitoes were before the experiment. Therefore, the
worst thing that could happen is that these experiments fail (they did not), and
mosquitoes continue to spread diseases. Even if these GMO mosquitoes do not
solve the problem, they do not cause new problems either.
Pro-GMO 4 Experts and scientists must have thought through all the relevant
factors and exerted tremendous effort for precaution. After all, it is their job to
use science properly to improve our life, so it probably makes sense for most
laypeople to trust experts’ judgement. When a GMO insect-free cotton was intro-
duced, the USDA, FDA and EPA were all involved in its review and the scientists
at each agency scrutinized everything imaginable.
Anti-GMO 1 GMO mosquitoes are not the only available solution since tar-
geted spraying is available. Most pesticides have been proven safe by established
researchers. Besides, only areas where humans are present need to be sprayed,
which dramatically minimizes the impact of pesticides. Why risk a release of
GMO mosquitoes when there is already a solution?
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Anti-GMO 2 Mosquitoes are part of a complex ecosystem and food chain. A
tiny change in the ecosystem can have huge ripple effects higher in the food
chain. By preventing their reproduction, we risk disrupting the entire ecosys-
tem. If the mosquitoes are eliminated, those fish, frogs, birds, other insects, and
arthropods that feed on larval or adult mosquitoes might be reduced because
of changes in their diet’s population. With that, predators of these animals are
affected as well.
Anti-GMO 3 Genetic modification might lead to unintended effects out of con-
trol. What if their interactions with other organisms in the environment change?
There is also the question of what will fill the gap or occupy the niche should the
target mosquitoes have been eliminated. Will other pests increase in number?
Will targeted diseases be able to switch vectors? Will these vectors be easier or
more difficult to control? We should be extremely cautious about something we
do not understand well.
Anti-GMO 4 The idea of GMO mosquitoes is against basic laws of nature. It is
widely believed that nature has made sure that a certain gene should function in
a certain way. Manipulation of it could cause some unwanted gene expressions.
Human intervention may interrupt the natural selection and may even make
survived mosquitoes become stronger than ever. A huge uncertainty as such is
simply beyond the scope of scientists’ promise. Science should not be used like
that.
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Appendix C. Sample instructions (for Pro.Endo treat-
ment group)
The stage numbering is not shown to subjects.
Stage 1.1: exposure to one version of slanted article On the following
page, you will read one of the two short articles on a GMO mosquito experiment
in Brazil.
Both articles are based on the same underlying facts published in academic
articles or news reports. However, they are slanted towards either pro-GMO
mosquitoes or anti-GMO mosquitoes. The one that you will read is determined
at random.
Please read the article carefully. There will be a few comprehension questions
afterward to ensure that the article has been carefully read. You can only proceed
if you answer these questions correctly.
This version is slanted towards pro-GMO mosquitoes. (See Appendix A.1 for
the article.)
Stage 1.2: elicitation of attitudes What is your opinion on the practice of
releasing GMO mosquitoes into the wild to prevent the spread of disease now?
Is it taking technology too far or is it appropriate usage of technology?
We will donate 100 dollars to the two organizations below after the study.
Organization 1: Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine (henceforth a pro-GMO
organization), a research institute that has a team dedicated to developing toolk-
its for the genetic manipulation of insects to fight against diseases.
Organization 2: GeneWatch (henceforth an anti-GMO organization), a not-
for-profit group that monitors developments in genetic technologies. This orga-
nization believes that GMO mosquitoes are a mistake and should be avoided in
the future.
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Please tell us how you would like to allocate the donation of 100 dollars be-
tween the two organizations. We will make the final donation according to the
average allocation of all respondents.
I would like to allocate to the pro-GMO organization: %;
The rest will go to the anti-GMO organization: %.
Stage 1.3: elicitation of estimates Recall that there exist two articles. While
you read a pro-GMO mosquitoes article, a previous group of respondents have
read both articles.
In addition to the articles, they also read eight pieces of arguments made by
a separate group of Internet users: 4 arguments from the pro-GMO side and 4
from the anti-GMO side.
After reading two articles and eight arguments, they indicated their prefer-
ence for the donation allocated between the two organizations.
Your task is to guess the average donation made by this group of respondents,
that is, their average percentage of donation allocated to the pro-GMO organiza-
tion.
This is a bonus task. You can choose an interval for your guess. If the actual
average percentage falls into your interval, you will earn a bonus of up to 1 dollar.
Notice that the wider the interval you select for your guess, the smaller the
size of the bonus will be. The exact amount of bonus in cents equals to 100 - the
width of the interval.
Stage 2.1: information acquisition In the remaining part of the study, you
will have access to the arguments that those respondents have read.
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Afterwards, you have a second chance to guess the average allocation of the
donation made by those respondents for the bonus task.
You can choose the number and the side of arguments you would like to read
before you guess again. (See Appendix B for the arguments.)
Stage 2.2 elicitation of attitudes What is your opinion on the practice of
releasing GMO mosquitoes into the wild to prevent the spread of disease now?
Is it taking technology too far or is it appropriate usage of technology?
You now have a second chance to revisit your donation allocation decision
made in Part I.
Please tell us how you would like to allocate our donation of 100 dollars be-
tween the two organizations at the moment. This decision will count for our final
donation.
Organization 1: Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine (pro-GMO organiza-
tion).
Organization 2: GeneWatch (anti-GMO organization).
I would like to allocate to the pro-GMO organization: %;
The rest will go to the anti-GMO organization: %.
Stage 2.2 elicitation of estimates You now have a second chance to revise
your guess. Your answer here will thus replace the first one you made at the
beginning and count for the bonus task.
What percentage of the donation do the previous group of respondents that
read both articles and all the arguments allocate to the pro-GMO organization,
Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine, on average?
Recall that the wider the interval you select for your guess, the smaller the
size of the bonus will be. The exact amount of bonus in cents equals to 100 - the
width of the interval.
While you read a pro-GMO mosquitoes article, another group of respondents
read an anti-GMO mosquitoes article.
Please guess: what percentage of donation does this group from the opposite
side allocate to the pro-GMO organization on average when deciding for the first
time (after they read the article)?




Appendix D. Pre-registered analysis plan
Research Design
The issue we are using is about a field practice on releasing genetically modified
mosquitoes to eliminate disease-carrying mosquitoes. There are two mutually-
exclusive sides of the issue, whether one supports or is against the practice. We
select this issue based on our pretesting results among participants on Mturk,
the flatform from which we plan to collect data. Among all the issues that we
pretested, participants have the least strong opinions on GMO mosquitoes and
have little knowledge about GMO mosquitoes, which fit the best according to the
objective of the study.
Figure 4.1 overviews the experimental setup. We implement a 2x2 (Complete/
Onesided ◊ Exo./Endo.) between-subject design that varies whether subjects are
initially exposed to complete or one-sided information about GMO mosquitoes
and whether subsequent arguments from both sides are exogenously provided to
participants or can be endogenously selected.
The initial exposure of information takes the form of one or two short articles
on the practice of using GMO mosquitoes to eliminate disease. It is commonly
known to subjects in all treatments that both articles are based on the same un-
derlying facts published in academic journals or news reports but are slanted
towards one side or the other. Subjects in Complete treatment read both arti-
cles with randomized order. Subjects in OneSided treatment only read one of
the two articles and it is made clear that which one they read is determined at
random. The side of the evidence, positive or negative, is counterbalanced across
participants in OneSided treatments.
After the initial exposure, we provide four arguments from each side of the
issue. These arguments were collected from online forums such as Quora. We
edit these arguments without changing their substances to make sure that they
are similar in clarity and length. While subjects in Exogenous treatments are
required to read and evaluate all arguments from both sides, subjects in Endoge-
nous treatments are able to endogenously select how many arguments to read
from either side. The presentation order of arguments is fully randomized.
We refer Complete-Exo treatment as the benchmark and the incentive of par-
ticipants in all treatment groups is to accurately estimate the final attitude of
the benchmark. The attitude to be estimated is an incentivized allocation of
donation between two organizations in favor of different sides. We collect par-
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ticipants’ self-reported attitudes, donations and estimates twice within subjects,
once after the exposure of evidence but before the introduction of arguments,
once after the introduction of arguments. The second elicitation is introduced as
a second chance to revisit their donation allocations and estimates. Participants
are aware from the beginning that the study consists of two parts, although they
are not aware of the existence of a second chance when deciding for the first time.
In total, we have six treatment groups and each subject participates in only
one treatment group. As depicted in Figure 4.1, each session may include some
of the following blocks depending on the treatment:
• Introduction, pre-screening on background knowledge and strength of the
prior of the issue;
• Treatment manipulation with one-sided evidence or complete evidence;
• First elicitation of self-report attitudes;
• First money allocation among organizations in favor of different sides;
• First estimation of the allocation made by the benchmark group;
• Selection or/and evaluation of arguments in favor of different sides to mea-
sure patterns of information acquisition;
• Final elicitation of self-report attitudes;
• Final money allocation among organizations in favor of different sides;
• Final estimation of the allocation made by the benchmark group;
• Additional questions to measure covariates of interest.
Data Collection and Exclusion Criteria
We plan to administer the experiment with a total of 900 U.S. respondents, that
is, 150 per treatment group in 6 treatment groups, via mTurkdata. The experi-
ment takes about 15-20 minutes to complete.
The experiment includes two screening questions to target participants of in-
terest. In particular, participants will be shortly introduced to the topic we are
using, genetically modified mosquitoes. We will then collect their knowledge and
opinions on a five point scale. If the participant is extremely knowledgeable (the
highest classification in the scale), or has extreme views on genetically modified
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mosquitoes (the highest or lowest classification in the scale), he or she immedi-
ately gets screened out of the experiment.
We also include a few comprehension questions related to the content in the
articles as an attention check on whether participants actually read the evidence
presented in the experiment. Participants can only proceed if they answer these
correctly.
Variables of Interest
1. Primary outcome variables: estimates of the benchmark’s final donation
before AND after the arguments:
• We incentivize the estimation of the benchmark’s final donation in all
groups based on accuracy.
• We incentivize the level of confidence in their estimates by associat-
ing bigger incentives with narrower confidence intervals of their esti-
mates.
2. Secondary outcome variables: attitudes before AND after the arguments:
• A self-reported attitude on whether the field practice takes technology
too far or is appropriate usage of technology on a Likert scale: [-4,4]
• An allocation of a donation of 100 dollars between two organizations
that favor two different sides: [0,1]
3. Secondary outcome variables: pattern of argument acquisition in treat-
ments with endogenous acquisition:
• Total number of arguments acquired: [0,8]
• Ratio of the number of conforming arguments (or confronting argu-
ments) among all acquired arguments: [0,1]
• Evaluation of convincingness of each acquired argument on a Likert
scale: [-4,4]
4. Secondary outcome variables: evaluation of arguments in groups with ex-
ogenous information:
• Evaluation of convincingness of each of all the arguments on a Likert
scale: [-4,4]
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5. Additional variables of interest:
• A measure of sophistication/awareness: we collect estimates of the
other side’s donation among subjects in OneSided-Exo and OneSided-
Endo treatments with bonus incentives at the end of the study.
• Cognitive uncertainty without incentives as in Enke and Graeber (2020).
6. Political preference and daily news consumption:
• Party affiliation
• A left/right political scale






• City of residence (to control for participants from Florida, where a sim-
ilar experiment has taken place)
• Religiosity
Hypotheses and Planned Analysis
For most of the analysis specified in this section, we mainly rely on across-
treatment comparisons using two-sided tests. The reason is that the results will
be interesting and informative either way, even though we have ex ante hypothe-
ses in favor of one direction over the other. The exception is 4.1, the first stage of
the whole experiment, where we will apply one-sided tests to maximize power.
In addition, we will also conduct complementary regression analysis to in-
clude more control variables, such as the number of acquired arguments. Yet,
we expect such an exercise to be very much likely underpowered since the to-
tal number of different possible combinations of arguments exceeds our planned
sample size per treatment, the calculation of which is mainly based on budget
consideration rather than a power calculation.
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Validating complete exposure
• Final estimates by Complete vs. donations of the benchmark: For those
in the treatments Complete, their final estimates of the benchmark’s final
donations are close to the actual donations of the benchmark.
• Remark: In treatment Complete-Endo, subjects’ first estimates may differ
from the benchmark’s actual donations because they have not read all the
arguments as subjects in the benchmark do. Yet, this holds constant in all
treatments.
First Stage: the Impact of One-sided Evidence
• First attitudes of OneSided vs. first attitudes of Complete: Before infor-
mation acquisition, the attitudes of subjects in treatments with one-sided
exposure will be biased towards their initial one-sided exposure as opposed
to those with a complete exposure. Such an impact will also reflect on their
first donation decisions.
• First estimates by OneSided vs. first estimates by Complete-Endo: The
first estimates by subjects with one-sided exposure will also be biased to-
wards their initial one-sided exposure as opposed to those with a complete
exposure.
• Remark: Benchmark group only provide estimates once after reading all
the arguments since their donation serves as a target.
Insufficient De-biasing in Estimates
• First estimates by Onesided-Endo vs. final estimates by Onesided-Endo
vs. actual donations of the benchmark: In treatments with one-sided ex-
posure and endogenous acquisition, the opportunity to acquire or to read
arguments will mitigate the impact of initial one-sided exposure but will
not fully de-bias subjects in treatments with one-sided exposure.
• First estimates by Onesided-Exo vs. final estimates by OneSided-Exo vs.
actual donations of the benchmark: In treatments with one-sided exposure,
making it compulsory to read all arguments will mitigate the impact of
initial one-sided exposure but will not fully de-bias subjects either. That is,
the impact of initial exposure to one-sided evidence is persistent.
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• Final estimates by OneSided-Endo vs. final estimates by OneSided-Exo: In
treatments with one-sided exposure, estimates by subjects who choose the
arguments they read will be more biased towards their initial one-sided
exposure as opposed to those who are required to read all arguments.
• First estimates vs. final estimates in Complete-Endo vs. actual donations
of the benchmark: Subjects’ final estimates are more accurate than their
first estimates with the opportunity to acquire the arguments.
• Remark 1: We predict a similar across-treatment pattern for our secondary
outcome variables, the self-reported attitudes and donation allocations. Yet,
we do not use the term ”de-biasing” when referring to these results. The
reason is that it is not possible to make normative judgement among these
secondary outcomes without making additional assumption on whether the
benchmark is closer to “truth”.
• Remark 2: It is however possible that the incentive to estimate the bench-
mark attitude accurately is large enough for some participants to fully com-
pensate for their initial one-sided exposure. To dis-aggregate the difference
across treatments, we thus analyze the connection between the effective-
ness of de-biasing and the pattern of argument acquisition at the individual
level.
Pattern of Argument Acquisition
• Number of arguments acquired by Onesided-Endo vs. number of argu-
ments acquired by Complete-Endo: In Endogenous treatments, those with
initial one-sided exposure may acquire relatively more conforming argu-
ments compared to those with initial complete exposure.
• Remark: When arguments are not costly, given the incentive to be accurate,
a Bayesian participant should acquire all arguments that are read by the
benchmark group. The acquisition behaviors of those who do not acquire
all arguments are thus not consistent with Bayesian rationality. We have
no ex ante hypothesis on whether the exposure of one-sided evidence makes
people more or less Bayesian.
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Pattern of Argument Evaluation
• Evaluation of each argument by OneSided vs. evaluation of corresponding
argument by the benchmark: Those with initial one-sided exposure may
evaluate conforming arguments more highly compared to those with a com-
plete initial exposure.
• Evaluation of each argument by OneSided-Endo vs. evaluation of corre-
sponding argument by OneSided-Exo: Those with initial one-sided expo-
sure may evaluate conforming arguments even more highly if these argu-
ments are selected endogenously.
• Evaluation of each argument by Complete-Endo vs. evaluation of corre-
sponding argument by the benchmark (a placebo test): Subjects with com-
plete exposure evaluate each argument similarly compared to the bench-
mark group even though the acquisition is endogenous.
• Remark: While our experiment is not designed to test Bayesian learning,
the direct comparison of evaluation of arguments across treatments per-
mits us to verify certain deviation from Bayesian updating, e.g. confirm-
ing bias, by investigating whether one-sided participants interpret self-
reinforcing arguments more favorably compared to the benchmark group.
Link between De-biasing and the Pattern of Argument Acquisition &
Evaluation at the Individual Level
• Onesided-Endo: Those who do not read all the arguments are more biased
by their initial one-sided evidence in their final estimates of the bench-
mark’s donations.
• Onesided-Endo: Those who acquire relatively more conforming arguments
are more biased by their initial one-sided evidence in their final estimates
of the benchmark’s donations.
• Onesided-Endo: Those who evaluate conforming arguments more highly
are more biased by their initial one-sided evidence in their final estimates
of the benchmark’s donations.
• Remark: Ex post, we will estimate the empirical number of arguments one
should at least acquire to come up with an estimate that is closer to the
benchmark’s donations using observations from Endogenous treatments.
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Connection with Other Covariates
• We will analyze the connection between our main results and several co-
variates to shed light on possible mechanisms. The variables that we are
particularly interested in include: confidence level in estimates, sophistica-
tion about the impact of one-sided evidence and cognitive uncertainty (Enke
and Graeber, 2020)
• We will also explore the connection between our main results and political
preferences, daily news consumption and other demographics.
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Appendix E. Summary statistics and randomiza-
tion check
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Appendix F. First and final attitudes and estimates
of Endo groups
Figure 8: Phase I: first average self-reported attitude, average donation to the
pro-GMO organization, and average estimate among subjects in Pro.Endo group,
Both.Endo group and Anti.Endo group.
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Figure 9: Phase II: final average self-reported attitude, average donation to the
pro-GMO organization, and average estimate among subjects in Pro.Endo group,
Both.Endo group and Anti.Endo group.
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Appendix G. First and final attitudes and estimates
of Exo groups
Figure 10: Phase I: first average self-reported attitude, average donation to the
pro-GMO organization, and average estimate among subjects in Pro.Exo group,
Both.Exo group and Anti.Exo group.
Appendix H. The effects of arguments on attitude
What remains unclear of this experiment is whether the arguments we provide
are informative and persuasive at all so that they are able to dilute the impact
of one-sided information? Should we expect these arguments to influence one’s
attitude in the first place? To answer these questions, we first show how sub-
jects evaluate the arguments in general. We then explore to what extent these
arguments can influence subjects’ attitudes.
Subjects rate each argument from “extremely unconvincing” to “extremely
convincing” on a 7-point Likert scale. Figure 12 presents the average rating on
the convincingness of each argument by all subjects who have read it. The argu-
ments vary a lot on their convincingness. Five out of eight arguments are rated
as convincing. Two arguments are neither unconvincing nor convincing, thus
they supposedly have no effect on attitudes. One argument may even backfire
since subjects find it slightly unconvincing.
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Figure 11: Phase II: final average self-reported attitude, average donation to the
pro-GMO organization, and average estimate among subjects in Pro.Exo group,
Both.Exo group and Anti.Exo group.
Do these arguments actually affect subjects’ attitudes? We estimate the ef-
fects of arguments on attitudes, pooling the evaluations by subjects in all treat-
ment groups:
 atti = “0 + Ai– + Xi— + ‘i (2)
where  atti is the change of individual i’s attitude before and after information
acquisition. Ai is the vector of eight dummy variables for the eight arguments: a
component equals to 1 if individual i had read the corresponding argument and
0 otherwise. Xi includes the individual’s prior attitude toward GMO mosquitoes
and knowledge about GMO mosquitoes in the pre-screening survey.
The results are reported in Table 3. One of the four pro-GMO arguments
leads to a more positive attitude toward the issue by 0.11 (p < 0.01) and in-
creases the donation allocated to the pro-GMO organization by 5.67 percentage
point (p = 0.033). One of the four anti-GMO arguments causes a more negative
attitude toward the issue by 0.16 (p < 0.01) and decreases the donation by 5.35
percentage point (p = 0.045). Thus, some arguments, although not all of them,
are informative enough to be able to influence attitude.
Taken together, the evidence in this appendix shows that the arguments we
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Prior attitude 0.002 ≠1.220
(0.017) (1.049)
Prior knowledge ≠0.002 3.042úúú
(0.016) (1.009)
Pro argument 1 0.063 2.319
(0.042) (2.643)
Pro argument 2 0.111úúú 5.666úú
(0.041) (2.589)
Pro argument 3 ≠0.001 0.895
(0.040) (2.531)
Pro argument 4 ≠0.005 0.676
(0.043) (2.706)
Anti argument 1 ≠0.004 0.811
(0.042) (2.630)
Anti argument 2 ≠0.160úúú ≠5.354úú
(0.042) (2.661)
Anti argument 3 ≠0.041 ≠1.671
(0.041) (2.609)






Adjusted R2 0.024 0.019
Note: úp<0.1; úúp<0.05; úúúp<0.01
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Figure 12: Subjective convincingness rating of arguments. Ratings are normal-
ized to [-1,1].
provide are non-negligible information and that they can influence subjects’ atti-
tudes.
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